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ABSTRACT 
 
What makes an act of violence an act of terrorism? This qualitative study examines 
the ways in which three U.S.-based cable news networks—MSNBC, CNN, and Fox 
News—reported and contextualized four violent events wi hin frameworks of terrorism: 
 the mass shooting at Ft. Hood near Killeen, Texas (2009); 
 the mass shooting near Tucson, Arizona (2011); 
 a suicidal plane crash into an IRS building in Austin, Texas (2010); and 
 the attempted bombing of the Federal Reserve in NewYork, New York (2012). 
Although details between these four events seem analogous, the three networks appeared 
to contextualize only the Ft. Hood rampage and the Federal Reserve plot within 
frameworks of terrorism (specifically, Islamic terrorism)—as being “attacks” on the 
United States rather than isolated incidents. In cotrast, the networks appeared to 
contextualize the Tucson rampage and Austin plane crash as being the consequences of 
extreme mental illness. 
Existing literature suggests such disparities in coverage are the result of increasing 
consolidation and corporatization of news and entertainment media organizations, as well 
as pre-existing Orientalist portrayals of Arabs and misconceptions held by the American 
public about Islam and Muslims as both a minority and  religious group. Combined with 
standard journalism guidelines and suggestions for optimal practice during crisis 
coverage, this literature was used to establish a coherent code structure to analyze the 
four events. The code structure was used to review a total of 35 video clips from the 
aforementioned networks, making note of these references or topics of discussion: 
 the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; 
 the mental state of the perpetrator; 
 the alleged religious or political affiliation of the suspected perpetrator; and 
 any mention of Al-Qaeda or terms such as “terrorist,” “jihad,” “infidel,” or 
“radical Islam.” 
Although any discussion about news coverage of minorit es is nuanced and merits 
further research, the results of this study indicate there is still much news organizations 
fail to understand about Islam, Muslims, the Muslim-A erican identity and the supposed 
relationship between those entities and “terrorism” or the root causes of its occurrence. 
Further, it indicates that news organizations experience a degree of cognitive dissonance 
when non-Muslims (or individuals affiliated with the dominant hegemonic culture) 
commit terrorism-like violence. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
On November 5, 2009, United States Army Major Nidal M lik Hasan opened fire 
on his fellow soldiers stationed at Ft. Hood near Killeen, Texas; he killed 13 people and 
wounded numerous others. At the start of his rampage, Hasan reportedly yelled, “Allahu 
akbar,” which means, “God is Great” in Arabic—a phrase said by Muslims around the 
world countless times every day. On January 8, 2011, 22-year-old Jared Lee Loughner 
opened fired on attendees at a rally for Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in Tucson, 
Arizona. The rampage injured 14 people, including Giffords, and killed six, including 
District Court Chief Judge John Roll. On February 18, 2010, Andrew Joseph Stack III 
crashed his single-engine Piper Dakota airplane into a  Internal Revenue Service office 
building in Austin, Texas, killing himself and office manager Vernon Hunter and injuring 
at least a dozen people. Finally, on October 17, 2012, 21-year-old international student 
Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis was arrested in a federal sting operation for 
attempting to detonate a fake bomb outside the Federal R serve in New York, New York. 
In each case, the perpetrator had previously expressed ome degree of frustration 
with or contempt for the United States or its foreign or socio-economic policies. 
However, it appeared as though cable news media contextualized the Ft. Hood rampage 
and Federal Reserve bomb plot within frameworks of terrorism—as being “attacks” by 
foreign entities on the United States. What are the reasons behind such disparities in news 
coverage? 
On the surface, it appears as though the details between the events are analogous: 
Hasan and Loughner both opened fire on unsuspecting victims and both were reportedly 
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distressed or disturbed in the weeks prior to their respective rampages.1 Similarly, Stack 
III and Nafis acted as “lone wolf” operatives, inteding their respective missions to 
disrupt some aspect of the American socio-economic system.2 What was it about each 
incident that caused cable news networks to frame Hasan and Nafis as terrorists, but 
Loughner and Stack III as mere malcontents (or otherwis  mentally disturbed 
individuals) with axes to grind against the governme t? Did the specific details 
surrounding these events affect the ways in which they were covered and framed by news 
organizations, or was it a matter of faith? 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, preventing terrorism became the 
highlight of U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Media pundits, government officials, and 
think tank representatives waxed philosophic about the “War on Terror” and the best 
manner in which to combat it, as if “terrorism” was  corporeal entity or sovereign nation 
and not a relatively abstract concept. During these di cussions, it was seemingly ignored 
that a portion of the American public associate terrorism exclusively with Islam 
(DeFoster, 2010)—a religion purportedly practiced by more than a billion people 
worldwide. Due to its conceptual intangibility, terrorism lends itself to subjective 
definition and application, especially by news media—a stratified segment of the industry 
due to cable television, the internet, and other new media technologies and services that 
allow consumers to receive information tailored to their specific interests and beliefs. The 
focus of this research is to examine the ways in which cable news media—specifically 
                                                        
1 In 2011, CBS News reported that Loughner first metCongresswoman Giffords in 2007 at an event and 
had asked her a question. According to CBS Homeland Security correspondent Bob Orr, Loughner made 
generic, unspecific threats between then and the tim of the shooting and might have been monitoring 
Giffords off-and-on in the interim. 
 
2 It also could be argued that both Stack III and Nafis’ missions “failed,” even though Stack III’s actions 
resulted in the death of one person. Given the method of his attack, however, Stack III likely did not inflict 
the damage he had intended. 
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MSNBC, CNN, and Fox News Channel—did or did not frame and contextualize these 
four events as “acts of terrorism.” Further, the focus is to examine the manner in which 
these networks did or did not frame and contextualize the reported suspects as 
“terrorists.” The research questions guiding this tesis are: 
RQ1: How are acts of violence framed and contextualized by news media 
organizations as “acts of terrorism?” 
RQ2: Do news media organizations define “terrorism” based on the circumstances 
of the incident, or the characteristics of the alleged perpetrator(s)? 
Such research is important due to the potential for it t  assist journalists and other 
media professionals report and discuss news about terrorism and the reasons behind its 
occurrence. Despite tremendous innovation in the realm of media technology and an 
increasing emphasis on user/consumer interactivity, the current broadcast news media 
landscape appears unable to discuss complex issues (such as terrorism) without 
defaulting to superlative speech from pundits and experts (self-styled or otherwise). This 
failing becomes especially apparent in the light of he natural constraints and limitations 
of contemporary broadcast news production. Thus, such research could encourage 
reporting that might help the public understand similar incidents in greater contexts 
beyond sound-bytes and edited-for-television footage, which then might facilitate deeper 
conversations among news media professionals, the public, and policy makers about the 
nature and root causes of terrorism, as opposed to discussions about how to prevent 
terrorism or the practicality of anti-terrorism init atives. In essence, this research 
endeavors to facilitate and further discussion about the best ways in which to treat the 
disease, not its symptoms. This theoretical flow is akin to what is referred to as the 
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“Triangle of Political Communication,” the process by which news media organizations 
“provide the links that allow the flow of messages between those in public offices and the 
general public” (Nacos, 2003, p. 4).  
Admittedly, this chain reaction of events is optimistic. Mainstream news media 
organizations are complex systems and it is unlikely that upon the completion and 
dissemination of this research, newsroom routines will simply change overnight. 
However, such optimism does not invalidate the importance or negate the relevance of 
attempting to show instances in which national news media have been, at the very least, 
inconsistent in their coverage and analysis of similar cases of terrorism-like events. This 
is especially important in the context of the “War on Terror” which, at the time of this 
research, will have experienced its tenth anniversary and cost the United States more than 
$1.28 trillion (Belasco, 2011). (This figure, of course, does not account for the numerous 
lives lost in both Afghanistan and Iraq.3) Arguably, news media have not adequately 
explained the nuances of terrorism and the ways in which it affects relations between the 
United States and the greater Muslim world, or even th  ways in which it affects Muslim-
Americans or comprehension and contextualization of contemporary Muslim-American 
identities. Without question, political tension betw en the United States government and 
the greater Muslim world presents problems for Muslim-Americans, who will eventually 
account for approximately 1.7 percent of the U.S. population (about 6.2 million people), 
according to a study by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (Grossman, 2011).  
Muslims comprise an incredibly diverse population—even within Arab 
communities—with variations based on cultural, ethnic, locational, and doctrinal factors. 
                                                        
3 The Pentagon declared an official end to the mission in Iraq on December 15, 2011. According to 
Pentagon statistics, the war in Iraq alone had claimed 4,487 American lives, with 32,226 more Americans 
wounded in action (Shanker, Schmidt, & Worth, 2011). 
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Due to its origin, however, Islam is most commonly associated with Arabs despite the 
fact the nations with the largest Muslim populations are non-Arab (Gottschalk & 
Greenberg, 2008).4 Iranians, also, are neither ethnically nor culturally considered to be 
Arab—an important fact to remember when discussing the modern history between the 
United States and the Muslim world, as well as the subsequent perceptions some 
Americans have about those regions.5  
The Muslim world is comprised of people and places with exceptionally rich 
histories, so it is not entirely implausible to assume that some people might find it 
difficult to understand the wide range of cultural, political, and socio-economic dynamics 
within them, let alone news professionals working to produce articles or broadcasts by 
tight deadlines. These difficulties are compounded by declining interest in traditional 
news/public affairs programs and an increasing appreciation for “infotainment” 
(Stockwell, 2004), which blurs the line between news and entertainment content in an 
attempt to enhance popularity with audiences and consumers (Demers, 2005), 
emphasizing sensationalized content that is highly speculative and glossy but low on 
actual substance. This is compounded even further by the idea that the American public 
has been conditioned by popular entertainment (e.g., films, television shows, cartoons, 
etc.) over the last century to be highly wary of Arabs and Muslims, whose culture and 
faith are viewed as being completely antithetical to and incompatible with U.S.—and by 
extension, Western—culture (Shaheen, 2003). “American popular wisdom has alienated 
itself from Islam” (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008, p. 6), viewing Christianity and 
                                                        
4 Those countries are Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh (p. 69). 
 
5 Although the terms of the definition are varied, Arabs are generally defined to be those peoples whose 
primary language is Arabic. The official and primary language of Iran is Farsi. 
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Judaism as “Western religious traditions” and Islam s an “Eastern religious tradition.” 
This dissimilarity is problematic due to the fact all three traditions share a common 
monotheistic ancestry through the prophet Abraham.  
Such arbitrary, seemingly uneducated distinction facilit tes an atmosphere of 
“otherness,” whereby news stories involving Arabs or Muslims are presented within a 
framework of socio-cultural deviance, if not imminent danger (Deeprawat, 2002; 
Shaheen, 2003). In 2007, former National Security Council Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski 
echoed this sentiment, saying the term “War on Terror” creates a culture of fear because 
it “obscures reason, intensifies emotions and makes it asier for demagogic politicians to 
mobilize the public on behalf of the policies they want to pursue.” With this in mind, it is 
unsurprising that more than one-third of Americans think unfavorably of Islam (Gallup, 
2009).6 Such connotative disparities can have dramatic effects on the socio-political 
economy of the United States and until they are examined, these groups might continue 
to feel isolated, insulted, or threatened. 
Role of the Researcher 
 As a Muslim and an Arab-American, I have a particular interest in the subject 
matter of this research. Since the September 11 attacks, many people in the Arab and 
Muslim communities have felt marginalized by news media and the industry’s 
unawareness of certain tenets of the Islamic faith nd apparent obliviousness to the 
cultural diversity present in Muslim populations. Whether it is due to socio-political 
agendas, newsroom routines, or simple academic ignorance or negligence, news 
professionals have misrepresented many aspects of a faith practiced by nearly one-
                                                        
6 It should be noted that this Gallup poll occurred between October 31 and November 13, 2009—a period 
spanning the Ft. Hood incident. It is conceivable that the timing of the poll influenced responses.  
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seventh of the world’s population, often associating secular cultural practices like female 
genital circumcision (otherwise known as “female genital mutilation”) or “honor killings” 
as parts of proper Islamic doctrine.  
News media networks appear quick to portray Islam in a negative light or at the 
very least, one that inadequately describes the historicity and historiography of Islam and 
the cultural and practical diversity within the religion. I can say this confidently because I 
am a member of these communities and have had several discussions with other members 
of these communities about the place of Arabs and Muslims in modern American society, 
as well as about the effects of such glaring omissions on the national dialogue and the 
development of domestic and foreign policy.  
To be clear, this research is neither an attempt to reduce the discussion of 
terrorism-like events to a simplistic causal relationship, nor is it intended to be a lengthy 
diatribe lamenting the oppressive actions of “The Man” against disaffected minority 
groups, Muslim or otherwise. Without question, the fundamental intent is to explore 
possible incongruities in the news coverage of terrorism-like events when circumstances 
between events are analogous. Therefore, to reduce the potential for this research to serve 
as an example of confirmation bias, the following literature review will examine the ways 
in which the increasing consolidation and corporatization of media organizations has 
blurred the lines between journalism, entertainment, and special interests, affecting 
newsroom routines and creating sensationalized “infotainment.” Further, it will examine 
the ways in which infotainment has cultivated an atmosphere in which traditional 
portrayals of Arabs and Muslims in U.S. popular media have influenced public discourse 
and perceptions about terrorism and the ways in which such portrayals have influenced 
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opinions of the Muslim world and identity. It also will examine the ways in which the 
U.S. has legally defined terrorism and the ways in which news media have traditionally 
framed and contextualized coverage of the Middle East and Muslims as a binary narrative 
depicting “Good Guys vs. Bad Guys.” Following these explanations, there will be a 
description of the methodology used for this research and finally, a discussion about its 
findings. 
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CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
Political Economy and Hegemony 
The relationship between a government and its media, specially its news media, 
is a critical one. A nation’s general media structure serves as a vital component in the 
machinations of government and social power structues, regardless of where those 
entities exist on the socio-political spectrum. Media systems reflect the political 
philosophies of the state (Merrill, 1974). From this idea, political economy refers to the 
manner in which media organizations reinforce or challenge the existing socio-cultural 
norms within a given society; it can also be considere  as the power processes occurring 
in a society (Smythe, 1960). These processes become evid nt not only through the 
manner in which content is produced (i.e., the structure of content), but also through the 
manifest and latent meanings and symbols present within that content (Mansell, 2003). 
Similarly, hegemony refers to the “power or dominance that one social group holds over 
others, referring to the ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ of political-economical-cultural 
relations between and among nation-states or differences between and among social 
classes within a nation” (Lull, 1995, p. 61). Hegemony is also “a method for gaining and 
maintain power” (p. 61), with mass media being the tools used by elites to perpetuate and 
further their status, influence, and philosophies (Boggs, 1976). These processes dictate 
the ways in which media messages are relayed to the public, as well as the ways in which 
they are understood and contextualized through the normative standards within society.   
It is important to note that socio-political norms are not always consistent with 
cultural norms; indeed, these two sets of norms can be in conflict, with reinforcement of 
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the former being due to the benefits and privileges they award to select individuals. In 
Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model (1988), media systems—specifically news 
media systems—serve as lap dogs subservient to the socio-economic and political elite 
(e.g., multinational organizations or media conglomerates); these systems legitimize the 
unjust policies and privileges of the state and corporations. News media systems silence 
or squelch voices of dissent, marginalizing ordinary citizens and positioning them as 
passive spectators (Hackett, 2001, p. 197). While radical speculation might lead one to 
believe that such deliberate silence is due to some grander, worldwide conspiracy that 
endeavors to subvert the population, a more practical and plausible reason behind why 
news media might align itself with the socio-economical and political elite is because it is 
simply better for business or more efficient operationally. “Control over the space of 
communication has thus always ebbed and flowed out f complementary and 
contradictory changes in regulation, economic markets, the political environment, and 
technological innovations” (Arsenault & Castells, 2008, p. 711). 
Editorial distortion occurs because of the fundamentally dependent relationships 
news media organizations have with private and governm ntal sources (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988). For example, if a news organization happens to feature stories or 
content counter or detrimental to the interests of its sources or advertisers (or the 
messages they release), that organization runs the risk of having its access to information 
restricted or, perhaps, excluded completely.7 This results in a downward spiral for the 
                                                        
7 Consider news coverage of Apple, Inc.’s highly anticipated iPhone 4: In April 2010, technology blog 
Gizmodo featured a number of articles about a prototype iPhone 4 that had come into its possession—much 
to Apple’s dismay. The articles revealed numerous photos and technical specifications. When Apple 
announced plans to release the iPhone 4 on carrier Verizon Wireless in 2011, Gizmodo was noticeably 
excluded from the release party, despite Gizmodo’s previous attendance at Apple events and writer Matt 
Buchanan’s claim the blog had, until then, a “great” friendship with Verizon. 
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news organization, which has now insulted or completely alienated its sources or 
advertisers and disabled itself from performing its duties in a satisfactory manner; this 
subsequently results in lower readership/circulation. Thus, in order to minimize 
significant threats to their overall business models and missions, news media 
organizations will distort their editorial positions to favor corporate policies or 
government interests. “Newspeople put their services at the command of anyone who 
promises to be a fertile source for future news or who can provide an attractive 
publishable story” (Graber, 2006, p. 161). In addition, broadcast networks are eager to 
deliver hyped-up scoops during “sweeps,” when ratings services tabulate viewership in 
order to configure advertising rates. Larger audiences mean higher prices (p. 161) and 
this is well known to special interest groups and public officials, who will exploit access 
to the public to further their respective socio-political agendas. 
 When news media organizations release press counter to messages propagated by 
elites or corporate sponsors, those organizations might experience campaigns 
manufactured by those influential entities that attempt to subvert the information or 
otherwise deter them from publishing more (e.g., letters to the editor, legislative actions, 
lawsuits, etc.). This sort of interference is referred to as “flak”—one of the five filters of 
editorial bias (Herman & Chomsky, 1988).8  Although the industry has changed 
dramatically in the three decades since he noted th increasing convergence of (news) 
media with more powerful socio-economic and political entities, critic Raymond 
Williams appeared prescient in 1977 when describing the relationship between 
                                                        
8 The other four biases are: Size, Ownership, and Profit Orientation; The Advertising License to Do 
Business; Sourcing Mass Media News; and Anti-communism, which has been modified to account for the 
“War on Terror.” 
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government or corporate interests and media and the significance of that relationship in 
any capitalist system: 
The major modern communication systems are now so evidently key institutions in 
advanced capitalist societies that they require the same kind of attention, at least 
initially, that is given to the institutions of industrial production and distribution.  
Studies of the ownership and control of the capitalist press, the capitalist cinema, 
and capitalist and state capitalist radio and television interlock, historically and 
theoretically, with wider analysis of capitalist society, capitalist economy and the 
neo-capitalist state. (Garnham, 1979, p. 123). 
Due to the continued integration of information and entertainment technologies into the 
everyday realities of contemporary societies, it becomes increasingly difficult to measure, 
discuss, or criticize the socio-political and socio- ultural influence of mass media. This is 
especially true for societies in which the overall standard of living is relatively high; thus, 
hegemonic structures can go unnoticed (Lull, 1995).  
Consolidation and Corporatization of Media Organizations 
 The media industry is a mammoth enterprise, evolving constantly and becoming 
more interactive and efficient due to advances in new media technologies and services 
that give more choice, on-demand content, and control to consumers. However, this 
apparent freedom of choice is a bit deceptive, as the wealth of options is offered by a 
select few organizations. Approximately 50 media firms dominated the U.S. media 
market in 1983; by 2004, this number had been reduced to five (Bagdikian, 2004). Not 
only do these companies control the production of various consumer goods, but also the 
messages that inform society and influence its culture and social norms. Arguably, these 
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companies maintain similar economic and political interests and possess the ability to 
promote or curtail various messages. Referring again to the ability for such entities to 
establish social norms, it is important to note “relationships between and among the 
major information-diffusing, socializing agencies of a society and the interacting, 
cumulative, socially accepted ideological orientations they create and sustain is the 
essence of hegemony” (Lull, 1995, p. 62).  
Although broadcast content (either online or television) is far more diversified 
than at any point previously, the fact these networks are owned and operated by larger 
multinational conglomerates subjects them to the political economic structures existing 
within those conglomerates, which primarily revolve around the creation of revenue and 
the promotion of special interests deemed commercially beneficial.9 Financial pressures 
prompt news media organizations to give favorable coverage to their own interests and 
those of “Corporate America.” Additionally, advertisers influence content by 
encouraging news tailored to white audiences, which they presume to be the most 
lucrative demographic (Greco Larson, 2006). Consistent with Herman and Chomsky’s 
ideas about the emphasis major media companies place on the generation of revenue over 
the production of quality (news or entertainment) content (1988), it is important to note 
the significance of making a substantial return on investment without upsetting the status 
quo: 
All these businesses—whether local, regional, or global—seek out optimal 
corporate strategies that take advantage of the potential created by the shifting 
                                                        
9 It could be argued this is common sense. Although there were broadcast programs aimed toward specific 
demographics 30 years ago, especially toward the end of the network era (1939 to 1980), there did not exist 
fully formed networks geared toward those demographics (e.g., BET, LOGO, Lifetime, etc.). This is in 
addition to the numerous channels geared toward a particular interest (e.g., Food Network, History 
Channel, E!, Disney Channel, etc.). 
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balances between mass communication and mass self-communication networks. 
The leading multi-national media conglomerates and diversified Internet/digital 
companies (i.e., Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and Apple) have developed strategies 
to ensure that the Web 2.0 Internet environment reinforces rather than 
undermines existing power configurations (Arsenault & Castells, 2008, p. 710).  
All of these pressures and motivations eventually pave the way for a media industry 
promoting “infotainment,” whereby content is produced and manipulated in order to elicit 
responses from audiences that favor the interests of the socio-political elite.10 
The current state of the news media industry seems designed to keep the public 
distracted by dramatic narratives, inconsequential “fluff” pieces at the local level (e.g., 
“Old man yells at cloud”) and over-analysis of social “wedge issues” (e.g., abortion, gay 
marriage, etc.) at the national level (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). This is compounded by 
the characteristics of American popular culture, which glorifies success (e.g., “the 
American Dream”), hard-fought, dramatic victories (.g., major league sports—especially 
the NFL—action stars and blockbuster movies, etc.), and extravagance (e.g., the E!, 
MTV, and Bravo television networks). Such dramatic narratives are critical elements in 
the creation of media content (especially television content), relying on thematic 
simplicity and the establishment of adversarial structures. These stories reflect some of 
the institutionalized norms of the broadcast media industry, which spoon-feeds 
information to the audience and constructs adversarial storylines or themes in order to 
maintain viewer interest (Hallin, 1986). These distrac ions keep the public from reflecting 
                                                        
10 During a May 2012 appearance on an episode of HBO’s Real Time with Bill Maher, former CBS News 
anchor Dan Rather noted the “constant consolidation of media,” saying, “very big business is in bed with 
very big government in Washington and has more to do with what the average person sees, hears, and reads
than most people know.” This relationship, he said, occurs “whether it’s Republican(s) or Democrat(s)” in 
positions of power. 
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upon news stories they might find disheartening or disturbing; counteractive to their 
preconceived opinions and beliefs; or otherwise challenging to the socio-political status 
quo. In essence, the journalism industry has gone from watchdog to mad dog, avoiding 
harder news stories “in favor of scandals, celebrities, and ‘infotainment’” (Hackett, 2001, 
p. 197).  
Still, the limits and pressures on the news system (i.e., the effects of gatekeeping 
and multilevel newsroom routines) are broader than t e commonsensical notion of media 
ownership and advertiser influence, simply due to the nature and inherent constraints of 
the industry. High costs have routinely contributed to the weakness of international news 
coverage and the scant coverage of more complex issues, perpetuating a cycle of 
misinformation and poor understanding (Seib, 2004). Noting the closure of numerous 
foreign bureaus and citing a pair of 2002 Pew Research Center studies, Seib adds that 
ratings given to international news coverage were substantially lower than ratings given 
to coverage of sports, national, local, and busines ws: 
Another survey, conducted for the Project for Excellence in Journalism, found 
that by spring 2002, network television news had largely reverted to its pre-9/11 
lineup of topics. The amount of hard news had dropped from 80 percent of stories 
in October 2001 to 52 percent in early 2002. Meanwhile, the number of 
“lifestyle” stories made a comeback. Such stories made up 18 percent of total 
network news stories in June 2001, only one percent in October 2001, and back to 
19 percent during the first 13 weeks of 2002. This continued a trend that has been 
noticeable for more than a decade (p. 77-78). 
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Furthermore, the “findings indicate that in this age of globalization, when the news 
media’s view of the world could and should become ever broader, intellectual 
isolationism has taken hold, at least in journalism and presumably in other fields as well” 
(p. 77-78). Indeed, there is only so much time avail ble during a typical 30- or 60-minute 
news broadcast; however, that does not dismiss the nec ssity for news professionals to 
either avoid arbitrary speculation or ignore adherence to classical journalism ethics.11 
Framing and Agenda-Setting 
“The boundary between ordinary reporting and manipulative journalism can blur” 
when news professionals and government officials or advertisers collaborate (Graber, 
2006, p. 160). For example, consider journalist David Barstow’s Pulitzer Prize-winning 
report about the convergence of mainstream news media operations and government 
interests in the months prior to and following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 
(2008).12 In the report, he discussed the dilemma of news media organizations using 
retired military officers as military analysts: 
Most of the analysts have ties to military contractors vested in the very war 
policies they are asked to assess on air. Those business relationships are hardly 
ever disclosed to the viewers, and sometimes not even to the networks themselves. 
But collectively…(the military analysts) represent more than 150 military 
                                                        
11 According to the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, journalists should: Seek truth and
report it; Minimize harm; Act independently; and Be accountable. Although additional principles are 
considered under these guidelines, these four values represent the key tenets of the Code (Straubhaar, 
LaRose & Davenport, 2010). 
 
12 Barstow’s articles reported an initiative developed by the Pentagon to cultivate favorable news coverag  
of the Bush administration’s wartime performance. After successfully suing the Department of Defense, th  
New York Times gained access to “8,000 pages of e-mail messages, tran cripts and records describing years 
of private briefings, trips to Iraq and Guantánamo and an extensive Pentagon talking points operation” 
revealing “a symbiotic relationship where the usual dividing lines between government and journalism 
have been obliterated.” Barstow writes that the Pentagon refers to the military analysts as “message 
multipliers” or “surrogates,” whose main task is to “deliver administration ‘themes and messages’ to 
millions of Americans ‘in the form of their own opinions’.” 
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contractors either as lobbyists, senior executives, board members or consultants. 
The companies include defense heavyweights, but also scores of smaller 
companies, all part of a vast assemblage of contracto s scrambling for hundreds 
of billions in military business generated by the administration’s war on terror. It 
is a furious competition, one in which inside information and easy access to 
senior officials are highly prized. Records and interviews show how the Bush 
administration has used its control over access andinformation in an effort to 
transform the analysts into a kind of media Trojan horse—an instrument intended 
to shape terrorism coverage from inside the major TV and radio networks. 
The report said many military analysts denied that t ey had allowed outside business 
interests to affect their on-air comments, making sure to keep network officials informed 
about their outside endeavors and potential conflicts of interest, even using their 
platforms to criticize the conduct of the war. However, some network officials 
acknowledged they did not hold military analysts to the same ethical standards as their 
news employees regarding outside financial interests. Such integration reveals “the 
merger between the American media and the military establishment” (Greenwald, 2012). 
This is just one way in which news media professionals can act as political 
partisans who use their access and influence to foster r direct conversation about pet 
causes or controversial subjects, causing stories to be framed in subjective, if not 
unconventional, ways. Framing is the process by which individuals collect anecdotal and 
stereotypical information to understand and respond t  events. Essentially, it is the series 
of mental filters people create due to cultural andbiological influences (Goffman, 1974). 
News media professionals use framing as a function of the gatekeeping process to present 
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information from a particular perspective, so that some details of content are emphasized 
and others remain obscured or hidden in the background (Graber, 2006). In an effort to 
create cognitive efficiency, frames are constructed individually and socially within a 
culture built through values, ideologies, narratives, and professional norms, helping 
journalists to convey information because they facilit te simplification of complex issues 
(Entman, 1993; Cuillier, 2012). Although frame selection varies from journalist to 
journalist and from situation to situation, instances of selective framing do occur, 
particularly with those stories deemed “uncontroversial” by decision-makers in the 
newsroom. “Journalists tend to exercise least control over the framing of uncontroversial 
news coming from official sources and most control over the framing of news about 
unexpected events or events unearthed by journalists through their own efforts” (Graber, 
2006, p. 162). News and media professionals greatly influence public debate and action 
regarding certain issues deemed important; and theydo this in ways they might not 
realize due to their respective social identities (Graber, 2006; Cuillier, 2012).  
 Social identity theory predicts intergroup behaviors n the basis of the perceived 
status, legitimacy and permeability of the intergroup environment. It also suggests people 
“associate with certain groups to bolster their self-esteem” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
Cuillier, 2012, p. 7) and classify others as either pa t of their ingroup or outgroup based 
on various demographical factors, including sex, race, religion, social status, and political 
beliefs. Intergroup bias occurs when “members of competing groups favor their own 
group and oppose those in the outgroup” (p. 7). It is he idea that people are most 
comfortable when they are around other people or cultures that reinforce or appear to 
validate their perceptions of themselves or the world. Similarly, people tend to retreat and 
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cling to their opinions when they are faced with their own mortality; this is the basis for 
terror management theory. Unlike other animals, “humans are aware that they will 
die…this fear would be paralyzing if it were not for defense mechanisms developed over 
time: clinging more strongly to cultural worldviews, increased affiliation with ingroups, 
and increased hostility toward outgroups” (p. 8).13 
 Following these lines of thought, journalistic bias is often apparent when the 
subjects of stories involve an ingroup or outgroup; this bias might manifest itself latently 
or evidently. Thus, in a stratified media landscape, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
some media professionals might make extraordinary efforts to appear as “objective” as 
possible when they report news stories, disregarding any premise that might lend itself to 
criticism about “biased coverage.” This leaves deeper explanation of critical issues up to 
the whims of politicians or demagogues, who might or might not have enough time to go 
over the details with the public prior to any legislative action. (This claim could also 
extend to pundits, polemicists, and other individuals who might manipulate the 
constraints of contemporary news media to broadcast select viewpoints.) This, in turn, 
makes the public ignorant about certain policy issue ; this is considered “one of the 
damaging consequences of such framing…public cynicism is another” (Graber, 2006, p. 
162.). Such cynicism could be argued as conducive to a stratified media landscape, 
whether it is from the point of view of consumers who want their opinions and values re-
affirmed or media organizations that would want to capitalize on fragmented markets.   
In many cases, news media organizations create the climate that spurs political 
action (Graber, 2006). Furthermore, agenda building te ds to occur around a precipitating 
                                                        
13 People might also cling strongly to familiar behaviors. For example, late ABC News anchor Peter 
Jennings said he had resumed smoking as a means to cope with the September 11 attacks. A long-time 
smoker, Jennings had given up the habit for about 20 years until that point. 
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event and begins when news and media professionals decide to publish stories they 
believe deserve national attention or scrutiny. This involves several steps, including the 
application of an interpretive frame that will capture the attention of the audience. For 
example, Watergate was seen as a mere partisan political t ff until news media and 
members of Congress began to depict it as an issue of “pervasive corruption and 
dishonesty at the highest levels of government” (p. 165). Without such attention, the 
public would never have accepted penalties for the off nding Watergate participants or 
even President Richard Nixon. The attention to detail given to the language of the 
adversarial narrative is fundamental to the public’s acceptance of the message within the 
conceptual framework:  
When newspeople and politicians switched from writing and talking about the 
Watergate “caper” or the “bugging incident” and began to discuss the 
Watergate “scandal” and “tragedy,” a once trivial incident became a very 
serious matter. The particular sources that journalists choose to cite for their 
story are important. Skewing inevitably takes place when one human source, 
rather than another, provides information and interpretation (p. 165). 
This does not belie the potential seriousness and severity of terrorism or any event 
of mass violence, nor is it an attempt to classify uch wantonly violent incidents as being 
“trivial.” Rather, it demonstrates the ways in which media organizations can manipulate 
and be selective about the terms they use to describ  events, as they are aware of the 
effects such terms might have on public opinion rega dless of intent. At the same time, by 
conveying stories in certain ways, news media can shed light on underreported stories; 
promote solutions to problems; and rectify serious grievances that might otherwise have 
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gone ignored by the public. “When the media make evnts seem important, average 
people as well as politicians discuss them and form pinion. This enhances the perceived 
importance of these events and ensures even more public and, possibly, political action” 
(p. 197). However, audiences do exercise degrees of judiciousness when it comes to the 
agendas proposed to them by news media organizations. 
Concepts of “Whiteness” 
The institutional routines of news organizations and the foreign policy interests of 
corporations or other influential specialty groups play important roles in the production 
and presentation of news content. Culture also plays an important role in how the public 
consumes and contextualizes media messages. Therefore, in rder to understand the ways 
in which matters of race, prejudice, and bigotry door do not factor into the 
aforementioned research questions, it is important to examine the ways in which they 
operate within the framework of “whiteness.” The term “whiteness” does not refer to skin 
color but instead, to the set of social and political standards whose cultural meanings 
have ideological and material consequences (Kincheloe, 1999). These are considered 
“normative” standards within U.S. society and are not challenged as the source of “bad” 
or otherwise “deviant” behaviors (Anselmi, 2000). Whiteness is “intimately involved 
with issues of power and power differences between white and non-white people” and 
thus, the concept “cannot be separated from hegemony” (Kincheloe, 1999, p. 162).  
Racially, whiteness is an ambiguous construct, if not one that is defined 
subjectively: 
Defining whiteness is really difficult because it is a default category. It's 
something that we don't define. And part of Whiteness is the fact that Whites don't 
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have to think about race. Ethnicity might matter but race doesn't matter to White 
people. And that is part of what whiteness is (Conley, 2003). 
 “Whiteness” also refers to feelings of entitlement a d the privilege of “not having to 
think about being in the norm or dominant group” (Conley, 2003). Furthermore, it is the 
understanding the United States’ social, political, and economic systems are designed for 
and operated by the dominant group. Regarding race and identity, these feelings remain 
unchallenged until they are juxtaposed against non-whites (Anselmi, 2000); conflict 
arises when non-white narratives enter the mainstream, facilitating the creation of 
tautological links to bridge dialectical gaps. For example, “if statistics show that blacks 
commit more street crimes than whites, some research rs immediately attribute a causal 
linkage between blackness and criminal activity,” but this “correlational evidence is not 
universally applied” (p. 51). If “evidence showed that whites engage in more 
embezzlement or illegal stock dealings than blacks, ‘whiteness’ would hardly be given as 
the explanation for this finding” (p. 51). This result  in the creation of stereotypes that 
“ignore individual differences by creating a generic image of a group that is applied to all 
of its members” (Greco Larson, 2006, p. 83). News and entertainment media 
organizations have awarded such caricatured stereotyp s a degree of factuality by not 
challenging them in their coverage and creative content, which already exhibits a lack of 
perspective and depth: 
Newsworthiness criteria used by journalists help exlain why positive stereotypes 
are less prevalent than negative ones. One of the crit ria is that news be familiar 
to the viewers. Because a racist history generates st reotypes, familiar stories are 
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more likely to be negative. The criteria of conflict and violence also draw 
reporters to stereotypes that demonize groups (p. 83). 
Although the prevalence of non-whites in news coverag  has increased, “hard 
news” stories (i.e., non-sports or entertainment cotent) featuring racial minorities often 
emphasize their threat to the social order and their opposition to whites, or reinforce the 
idea they are a direct threat to the interests of the s atus quo (Greco Larson, 2006). This is 
the case even when news stories depict minorities in positive ways, creating a paradox in 
the minds of white audiences through coverage that s ows minorities as being “similar 
but different” to them. Non-whites gain acceptance by assimilating to the social order, 
working hard, and adhering to the rules of the establi hed socio-cultural system; however, 
they are different in that minorities often will not r cannot do these things. “The two 
messages allow the news to celebrate American values nd justify inequality at the same 
time” (p. 84).  
In regard to news coverage, the consequence of such paradoxical depictions is the 
establishment of a dichotomy that classifies minorities as “good” or “bad.” “Good” 
minority groups are those who accomplish (or demonstrate aspects of) “the American 
Dream” (i.e., “pick themselves up by their own bootstraps;” “from rags to riches;” etc.) 
The achievements of these “good” minority groups not only promote prejudicial and 
discriminative social practices as outdated, but also ideas of assimilation by 
demonstrating that “those who escape their designated place are not a threat to society 
because they manifest the same values and ambitions as the dominant culture and 
overcome the deficits of their home communities” (p. 84).  
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Contrarily, “bad” minority groups are those who are“either creating problems for 
others or plagued by their own difficulties” (p. 84). This idea is compounded further by 
the lack of depth, perspective, and historical context news media organizations give to 
stories about minority groups, making their actions appear “pathological, self-defeating, 
irrational, and due to inherent character flaws” and concurrent with the assumptions of 
white audiences (pp. 84-85). Thus, an impression is given to audiences that control of 
these “problem” minorities is a good thing because it preserves the socio-cultural norms 
enjoyed by whites and the “good” minorities who emulate them. “The politics of 
whiteness has been enormously, and often terrifyingl , effective in the formations of 
coalitions that unite people across cultural differences, across class and gender relations, 
and against their best interests” (Apple, 2006, p. 236). Naturally, such socio-cultural 
inequality and disparity facilitates an atmosphere of “Us” versus “Them”—or 
“Otherness.” 
Concepts of “Otherness” 
U.S. popular media often portray minority groups within a framework of 
“otherness,” a construct that contextualizes them as being “deviant” from the normative 
standards of the status quo. Even in today’s ever eolving, increasingly interactive media 
environment, xenophobic ideologies and content persist and remain influential despite the 
capabilities of new media technologies to disseminate information quickly and connect 
people to one another (Esposito & Kalin, 2011). Otherness depends on an audience’s 
implicit understanding of what is “normal” (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008). This is 
critical due to the socio-economic, cultural, and political benefits awarded to the 
members of the dominant groups within society. Arguably, people who are least affected 
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by the hegemonic structures are likely to be the least aware of the influence it has on 
people affected the most. As comedian Dave Chappelle said during a 2006 appearance on 
an episode of A&E’s Inside the Actors Studio: 
America needs an honest discourse with itself. Thisis, like, the greatest country in 
the world by default…but we could actually be the gr atest country that ever 
existed if we were just honest about who we are, what e are, where we wanna 
go—and if we learn how to have that discourse. Things like racism are 
institutionalized, it’s systemic. You might not know any bigots—you feel like, 
“Well, I don’t hate black people, so I’m not a racist”—but you benefit from 
racism just by the merit of the color of your skin. There’s opportunities that you 
had—you’re privileged in ways that you may not even realize because you haven’t 
been deprived in certain ways. 
“The Other” (“them”) is distinguished from the mainstream, rational community 
(“us”) by characteristics seen as aberrant from conceptions of civility, morality, and 
restraint. Furthermore, “the ‘other’ is one that poses a threat to a sense of national 
security, which often hinders on an existing notion of the national image” (Deeprawat, 
2002, p. 10), ultimately demonstrating an imminent threat to a sense of social order. It is 
an enemy image created through a binary dynamic of “us” versus “them.”  
For example, consider professional wrestling—a popular form of entertainment 
that has used the “Us vs. Them” narrative routinely during its boom periods in the 1980s, 
late-1990s, and as recently as 2005. During the golden age of pro wrestling in the 1960s 
and ‘70s, stylized “foreign” villains (often portrayed by Americans) like Fritz Von Erich 
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and Baron Von Raschke,14 The Sheik and Abdullah the Butcher,15 Kamala the Ugandan 
Giant,16 Ivan Koloff,17 and Tojo Yamamoto18 antagonized audiences while brutalizing 
their American flag-waving heroes inside the ring.19 The morality plays that took place 
inside the “squared circle” drew huge audiences, who gladly paid to watch their heroes 
vindicate American values against these egregiously foul foreign fanatics. 
Even when portrayals of minorities are framed in ways that could be assumed as 
being positive (at least outwardly), they are still portrayed as being subservient to 
dominant themes of whiteness (Entman & Rojecki, 2000); this is especially true for 
portrayals of African-Americans. In movies such as The Legend of Bagger Vance, The 
Green Mile, and The Family Man, the “simple” African-American protagonist supplies 
folksy assistance to the white protagonist, whose world is too complicated by the 
demands of industry and empire building to devote any time toward his spiritual and 
emotional well being. Although such portrayals have positive, racially harmonious 
connotations, they also link African-American culture and knowledge with the 
supernatural world. By contrast, films like J rry Maguire, Men of Honor, and Finding 
Forrester convey images in which African-Americans are in need of whites to make 
sense of the world, save them, or manage their affairs.  
                                                        
14 Nazi Germany 
 
15 Pan-Arabia 
 
16 Pan-Africa 
 
17 Soviet Russia 
 
18 Japan 
 
19 Minority characters, regardless of their status as “good guys” or “bad guys” often exhibited similar traits. 
For example, characters hailing from any of the Pacific islands (e.g., “Superfly” Jimmy Snuka, the Wild 
Samoans, etc.) were often described and portrayed as being “savage” and “animalistic” in their manner and 
in-ring prowess. Similarly, African-American characters were portrayed as being “hard-headed” and thus,
immune to attacks to that area (e.g., the Junkyard Dog, Koko B. Ware, etc.). 
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Such portrayals demonstrate gaps in the “social status, economic resources, 
cultural influence, and political power between white Americans as a whole and Black 
Americans as a whole” (Entman & Rojecki, 2000, p. xxiv). The constructs of political 
economy extend this growing disparity to other minorities, too. These gaps persist not 
only due to historically manifest hegemonic factors, but also because of latent factors of 
otherness:  
Real multiculturalism is an ideal that is yet to be realized, although societies can 
congratulate themselves on having managed to become nscious of the existence 
and validity of the ‘Other,’ mainly on a purely humanitarian level, which, though 
at times protected by legislation, does not percolate down to the national 
consciousness or collective unconscious…deeply heldideas, underscored by 
nationalism and xenophobia, still motivate societal systems—no matter how 
insidiously—and therefore continue to be exploited n wider elements of popular 
culture today (Al-Shaikh-Ali, 2011, p. 144). 
For example, there is no ethnically equivalent racial slur that can be used to 
describe whites as a whole in the same way the words “(sand) nigger,” “camel jockey,” 
or “dune coon” could describe Blacks or Arabs (Entman & Rojecki, 2000, p. xxv). 
Further, as Western society encounters groups less assimilated to “white culture,” there 
exist words and stereotypes that “can injure by contributing to others’ prejudices, and 
might ultimately be translated into adverse resource allocations for group members” (p. 
xxv). As will be explicated in the next section, such disparities have affected Arab and 
Muslim populations both before and after the September 11 terror attacks. 
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Portrayals of Arabs, Islam, and Muslims in U.S. News and Popular Media 
For more than four decades, the United States has maintained a rather adversarial 
relationship with the culture, socio-political constructs, and people of the Middle East. 
“The Arabs and the Middle East did not and do not always respond to (American) desires 
as we expect them to in our political designs and schemes, i.e., our ideologies and myths” 
(Semmerling, 2006, p. 23). Within the American psyche, this has cultivated an 
atmosphere of fear, one that “upsets the entire binary system of (America’s) Orientalist 
project” (p. 23). In this atmosphere, the most egregious acts and images of destruction are 
made rational in the contextualization of narratives in which Arabs—and by extension, 
Muslims all over the world—“threaten our ideological mythic structures” (p. 23). In the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks, these fears r ceive additional nourishment by 
notions that despite the United States’ political and military efforts within the Middle 
East (as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan), it remains unclear (in the minds of 
Americans) as to which ideology has proven itself superior: the righteousness of the 
American, or the wickedness of the “evil” Arabs. 
Arabs and other socio-cultural nuances of the Middle East have long been 
subjects of caricature and ridicule in Western art, literature, and other popular media and 
entertainment. Arnold Schwarzenegger defeated the “Crimson Jihad” in the 1994 
blockbuster True Lies; Doc Brown powered his time machine using plutonium stolen 
from Libyan nationalists in 1985’s Back to the Future; special agent Jack Bauer routinely 
battled Islamic militants throughout the duration of the television series 24; and even 
Richie Rich and Bugs Bunny have matched wits with smarmy Arab sheiks. News 
organizations, too, appear quick to frame stories of conflict in the Middle East or 
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involving persons of Arab ancestry using terms such as “extremists,” “fanatics,” and 
“terrorists” (El-Farra, 1996). These terms received increasing attention after the 
September 11 attacks, when news organizations were reporting the first stages of crisis 
coverage.20 News media organizations also tend to employ different strategies when 
covering an anti-American terrorist act than when covering other foreign policy issues 
(Nacos, 1994). Instead of relying on traditional administrative sources, news media 
organizations call upon a variety of sources to help make sense of the situation, including 
terrorists and their allies, families of the victims, and critics of the establishment.  
Arab stereotypes, depicting them as inherently oily (f guratively and literally) and 
threateningly different people, have remained constant over time and fostered feelings of 
mistrust and disdain in the American psyche (Shaheen, 1984).21 Even in the caricaturized 
world of professional wrestling, the narrative of the devious, crazed Arab is routinely told 
within a jingoistic framework. One of the most enduring portrayals of such villainy 
transpired during the Iran hostage crisis, which occurred from November 1979 to January 
1981. Audiences around the country jeered the Iron Sheik, an Iranian nationalist who 
insulted American values and came to the ring waving a flag emblazoned with “the 
virtual face of Islam in Western popular culture,” Ayatollah Khomeini (Nasr, 2006, p. 
138)—Iran’s newly established, staunchly conservative political and religious authority 
who Time Magazine named “Man of the Year” in 1979. Of course, the Iron Sheik 
                                                        
20 Although the shift was more pronounced in local news coverage (specifically in New York City), both 
local and national news made an overwhelming shift from episodic to thematic framing patterns in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Before September 11, “support for protecting the civil liberties of 
American Muslims and Arabs was more often expressed in national reporting than in New York 
metropolitan area news” (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2006, p. 16). 
  
21 In “100 Years of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim stereotyping,” Mazin B. Qumsiyeh of the American Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee comments that traditionally, Arabs and Muslims are depicted in art and 
literature as one of three “Bs”: Billionaires, Belly-dancers, and Bombers. 
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eventually received his comeuppance from Sgt. Slaughter, a camouflage-wearing drill 
instructor whose signature hold, called the “Cobra Clutch,” hearkened back to the 
revolutionary patriotism reflected in the Gadsden flag.22 The Iron Sheik’s defeat inside 
the ring symbolized the superiority of the United States over the idea of pan-Arabian 
nationalism (and by proxy, the superiority of “Judeo-Christian” American/Western 
culture over Islam and Arab culture)—despite the fact that Iranians are neither ethnically 
nor culturally considered to be Arab. The reasons behind this assertion could be found by 
furthering Shaheen’s hypothesis (1984) of the logical fallacy employed by producers of 
contemporary news and entertainment:  
1. The Middle East is comprised of Arabs; 
2. All Arabs are (practicing) Muslims;  
3. All Arabs/Muslims are uncivilized, enslaving rulers of kingdoms;  
4. Kingdoms are incompatible with democracy and Western values;  
5. Democracy and Western values promote reasoning, equality, justice, and 
individualism. 
6. Therefore, Arabs/Muslims are enemies to promoters of reason, equality, 
justice, and individualism. 
 Despite periods of genuine scholarship and awareness, “ignorance, conflict, and 
demonization have also been present, namely through the Crusades, imperialism, and 
colonialism” (Abbas, 2011, p. 65). Throughout these p riods, Muslims have been 
                                                        
22 Interestingly enough, when Sgt. Slaughter portrayed an Iraqi-sympathizer during the first Gulf War, he
and the Iron Sheik would join forces to combat the wr stling world’s new red, white, and blue-blooded, all-
American hero: Hulk Hogan. During Slaughter and Hogan’s match at WrestleMania VII in 1991, 
announcer Gorilla Monsoon’s commentary seemingly defined “the Iraqis” as fundamentally different than 
the “overwhelming majority of Arab-Americans” who disagreed with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s 
tactics. The World Wrestling Federation—now known as WWE—revisited the Iraqi-sympathizer gimmick 
in 2004 with the introduction of “Muhammad Hassan,” who riled audiences during the early years of the 
second Iraq war. 
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portrayed as “savage,” “moronic,” “small minded,” or “fanatical religious militants.” 
These negative characterizations and treatments of the “Muslim other” still exist today as 
part of an effort to aggrandize established powers and, in the process, “legitimize existing 
modes of domination and subordination in social, economic, and political life” (p. 65). 
Current fear of Muslims “has its own idiosyncratic features that connect it with more 
recent experiences of neocolonialism, decolonization, immigration and postwar racism” 
(p. 65). This cultivates “Islamophobia,” a concept that denotes “acts of intolerance, 
discrimination, unfounded fear, and racism against Islam and Muslims” (Esposito & 
Kalin, 2011, p. 4). The premises of Islamophobia are as follows: 
1.  Muslim cultures are seen as monolithic; 
2. Islamic cultures are substantially different from other cultures; 
3. Islam is perceived as implacably threatening; 
4. Adherents of Islam use their faith to gain political or military advantage; 
5. Muslim criticism of Western cultures and societies is rejected out of hand; 
6. The fear of Islam is mixed with racist hostility to immigration; and 
7. Islamophobia is assumed to be natural and unproblematic. 
Furthermore: 
This typology conveniently provides a range of descriptors in relation to 
Islamophobia, where the concept captures primary functions that are historical, 
cultural, and policy oriented in scope. The characteristics of Islamophobia relate 
to how it is defined by “the other” so as to become further “othered” by the very 
same “otherer,” where this “othering” is related to racist fear and hostility, as 
well as to the apparently irredeemable nature of Islam and Muslims…While 
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racism on the basis of “Race” is still present, the anti-Muslim shift suggest 
markers of difference of a social and religio-cultural nature (Abbas, 2011, p. 66). 
Another way in which Arabs, Muslims, and the greater Middle East receive 
scrutiny is within a framework of Orientalism, a term redefined by Said (1978) to 
describe the manner in which Western (or Occidental) powers create images and 
perceptions—both artistic and academic—of non-Western p oples to further imperialistic 
goals: 
So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight overstatement 
to say that Muslims and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or 
potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of 
Arab-Muslim life has entered the awareness of even those people whose 
profession it is to report the Arab world. What we have instead is a series of 
crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world p esented in such a way as to 
make that world vulnerable to military aggression (Said, 1980).   
Citing the 1992 Disney animated film Aladdin, based on the classic tale from the 
One Thousand and One (Arabian) Nights, Addison (1993) expands on the erasure of 
nuance and the amalgamation of diverse cultures by Western producers: 
Venal vendors, half-dead hash-smokers, sword swalloers, veiled women, nearly 
naked veiled women, belly-dancers, acrobats, camels, elephants, Bengal tigers, 
cobras, Arabian steeds, desert, garden, scarab, fez, turban, khufiyyah, pyramid, 
pagoda, Taj-Mahal, suq, classical ruins, Allah, the djinn, and the Chinese New 
Year are fused to represent the Orient created by the European academy. By 
combining this material undistinguished into one field, the distinctive signatures 
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of these cultures (China, India, Arabia, Morocco, et al.) are erased and replaced 
by a familiar ideological configuration (p. 7). 
Though cautious not to attribute the situation to an environment of anti-intellectualism or 
a simplistic causal relationship, Said (1980) notes that political authority evolves by 
identifying new places of “national interest” and then classifying them as inherently 
inferior to the predominant system.  
It is important to note, however, that such feelings change in accordance with the 
geo-political relationship between individual Arab or Muslim nations and the United 
States. Positive images exist as long as these nations are supportive of the United States 
or its policies (Ghareeb, 1983)—the Saudi royal family, or the Afghan freedom fighters 
that stood against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, for example. News and media 
professionals have traditionally done a poor job of describing the nuances of Arab 
culture, Islam and Muslims, and the overall historicity of the socio-political and 
economic conditions of the Middle East (Said, 1997)—not to mention the effects of 
nearly a century of United States foreign policy that cannot be considered to have always 
been in the best interests of Middle Easterners. Media organizations tend to reduce 
Middle East affairs—especially those involving Islam—to matters of extremism (or 
“fundamentalism” or “radicalism”), without any consideration for the various cultural 
differences present throughout the Muslim world, many of which have no practical basis 
in Islam; also, without any concrete methodology for defining such abstract terminology: 
Does every one of the billion Muslims in the world feel rage and inferiority, does 
every citizen of Indonesia, Pakistan, or Egypt resent “Western” influences? How 
would one set about getting answers to such basic questions? Or is it the case that 
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“Islam” cannot be investigated as we would any other culture or religion 
because, unlike all the others, it stands outside “normal” human experience . . . 
as if it, and everything within it, resembles a psychopathological human being? 
(p. xviii).  
Long before September 11, 2011, Arabs and Muslims were portrayed in popular 
media as womanizing, misogynistic, anti-Western zealots who were out to destroy 
everything that was good, wholesome, and apple pie loving about America. In some 
cases, they also were presented as otherworldly purveyo s, avatars, and vessels of the 
occult. Furthering notions of otherness inherent within Orientalist frameworks and citing 
the classic 1973 horror film The Exorcist, Semmerling (2006) describes the antagonist 
demon’s origins and language as “within the heredity of the Arab” (p. 56), pervading the 
dimension of normative language and commandeering “the conceptual orders and modes 
of action of our culture to which we have become so inclined and accustomed” (p. 57). 23 
The prologue, in which the demon is unearthed in Iraq, present “disjunctive Orientalist 
caricatures of Arab people,” and “an entextualization of the Arab landscape, Arab bodies 
and faces, Arabic language, Islamic practices, and slices of Arab life” (pp. 57-58). Since 
such “entextualized elements work within the traditions and parameters of Orientalism, a 
perceived reality in our Western minds, they become plausible” (p. 58). 
Drawing a parallel to Walt Disney’s animation theory of the plausible 
impossible—the process by which impossible elements within a narrative can happen if 
they are prepared as possible—he goes on to say that many of these perceptions 
fermented during the political turmoil of the early 1970s. In essence, the past is prologue:  
                                                        
23 The Exorcist is based on William Peter Blatty’s 1971 novel of the same name by. In 1999, Entertainment 
Weekly ranked it as “the scariest movie of all-time.” 
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This was the period of the Egyptian and Syrian surprise attack on Israel, the rise 
of Palestinian international terrorism striking West rn Europe, a bellicose Libyan 
leader calling for Pan-Arabism and an Islamic Revival, and Middle East oil 
embargoes against the West. Magazines and newspapers were replete with stories 
and images of conspiring and plotting Arab leaders; masked Palestinian 
guerrillas attacking Western institutions like airliners, airports, and the 
Olympics; fantastically rich Arabs draining the treasures of oil-consuming 
nations and unable to spend the proceeds fast enough; prototypes of American 
gas ration coupons; and Midwestern children dressed in winter coats, hats, and 
gloves studying in their cold classrooms. The American public had been primed to 
believe that the Arabs were rising up from their ‘dusty and dingy’ capitals, 
infiltrating the security of American lives, and demanding to be treated with 
‘deadly seriousness’ (p. 58). 
However, Americans did not have to worry too much about their values being 
overthrown or children being possessed or indoctrinated because they had actors like 
Denzel Washington, Bruce Willis, and Harrison Ford defending America’s honor (and, 
arguably, the honor of the free world) from the likes of unscrupulous Arab radicals24 and 
Nazi-sympathizing, gun-toting Egyptians.25 “These scenarios and others depicted us as 
perfectly good angels killing them perfectly evil infidels. They assured audiences that 
God was on our side, that we were good Clint ‘Make my day’ Eastwood guys, sure to 
win easily over bad Arab guys” (Shaheen, 2008, p. xix). Of course, popular media 
portrayals of Arabs, Islam, and Muslims intensified after September 11, although there 
                                                        
24 The Siege (1998) 
25 Raiders of the Lost Ark (1981) 
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were instances in which popular media portrayed Arabs s worthy individuals. Still, for 
every episode of The Simpsons depicting friendship between Bart Simpson and his new 
Muslim neighbors,26 there exist films like Executive Decision (1996) in which the 
protagonists must save Washington D.C. from the supporters of fictional terrorist El 
Sayed Jaffa, or Iron Man (2008), which was re-tooled for contemporary audiences to 
feature antagonists of supposedly Arab and Afghan descent.27 
Islamophobic discourse has long masqueraded in Western media as art and 
literature (Abbas, 2011).28  Arabs are the most maligned group in the history of 
Hollywood (Shaheen, 2008). While African Americans could argue this sentiment 
because of overt racism, Arabs and Muslims could argue based on overt bigotry toward 
their beliefs and culture, which are seen as inferior to Western values, philosophy and 
(perhaps) Judeo-Christian historicity. It is one thing to portray negatively an ethnic or 
minority group because of a characteristic they have no control over (skin color, for 
example), as such portrayals can obviously be dismissed due to their blatant rhetorical 
absurdities, but it is something else entirely to portray negatively the particular beliefs of 
a given group. Arguably, this is a gray area because unlike skin color or ethnicity, a belief 
(or non-belief) set is subjective and can be discarded, critiqued, changed, or adapted by a 
person at any time, especially if “civilized” populations perceive them as being 
                                                        
26 “Mypods and Broomsticks” is the seventh episode of the twentieth season of The Simpsons. 
 
27 Published by Marvel Comics, Iron Man debuted in March 1963 as an anti-Communist hero. The
character’s origin story involved his alter ego, American billionaire Tony Stark, becoming a prisoner of war 
to the Vietcong, who hoped to use his expertise to design their weapons. Maintaining the core narrative of 
his abduction, Iron Man’s origin story would be re-imagined in subsequent releases of the comic book. 
 
28 Speaking of art, “political cartoons, in particular, demonstrate quite vividly the Islamophobia that s 
been alternately latent and manifest in the United States for more than two centuries” (Gottschalk & 
Greenberg, 2011, p. 196). Furthermore, “the oil crisis of the 1970s and the concomitant rise of Arab 
purchases of American real estate and business interests compelled many cartoonists to portray Arabs as 
omnivorous gluttons who threatened to consume the United States” (p. 206). This causes Muslims to play a 
negative and unwitting role in defining the American norm. 
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antithetical to “modernity” or ultimately and categorically wrong. “Islamophobia is 
particularly pernicious because, like sexism, racism, and homophobia, the fear of Islam 
has become normalized within American and other Western cultures. In other words, 
news organizations, entertainment businesses, political discourse, and everyday 
conversations of individuals express anxiety about Islam by using conclusions so taken 
for granted that they become truisms—neither needing substantiation nor likely to be 
challenged” (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2011, p. 196). 
“Hate rhetoric, the War on Terror, the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the 
Middle East have generated damaging new media stereotypes and new government law 
enforcement policies” (Shaheen, 2008, p. 7). With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
effectively ending the Cold War, the socio-political and economic elites of the United 
States were in need of a new social control mechanism, one they could use to maintain 
the status quo perpetuated by the constant emphasis of the “Us vs. Them (Soviet 
Russia/Communism)” media narrative; this was done by modifying the socio-political 
norms of the Cold War to create the “War on Terror” (Chomsky, 2001). This conceptual 
re-configuration was mentioned by the New York Times in January 1996 with the 
headline, “The Red Menace is Gone. But Here’s Islam” (Said, 1997, p. xix). Said 
contends that such an idea is, by its nature, absurd by its “unprovable, purely polemical 
essentials” (p. xx). 
Defining Terrorism to the Public 
Although terrorism might be an intangible, abstract concept within socio-political 
frameworks, legally speaking, it has an established d finition. The U.S. government 
codifies terrorism as involving “(a) acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
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the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (b) appear to be intended—(i) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (c) oc ur primarily within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States” (DeFoster, 2010, p. 3-4). This is a rather broad 
definition as, theoretically, any act that is in violation of this outline could be considered 
an act of terrorism, regardless of the greater circumstances surrounding the event or the 
motivations behind it. 
Yin (2012) expands on the technical definition of terrorism, saying the tactic is 
not always about clandestine attacks designed to kill as many innocent people as possible. 
Further, that terrorism has “encompassed left-wing, right-wing, and religions 
terrorists…with different tactics and goals” (p. 4)He also emphasizes the importance of 
intimidation and coercion in quantifying the definit on, noting a different subsection on 
immigration includes “‘highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance,’ hostage taking ‘in 
order to compel a third person (including a governme tal organization) to do or abstain 
from doing any act,’ and assassination, use of biolog cal, chemical, or nuclear weapon” in 
its definition (p. 4).29 “A third section defines terrorism as ‘premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents” (p. 5).30 These definitions are important due to the ways in which 
terrorism is understood and contextualized socio-politically:  
These definitions presume that there will be some statement from the alleged 
perpetrator of an act, or demand, or at the minimum, indication of responsibility, 
                                                        
29 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
30 22 U.S.C. § 2656f. 
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from which we can determine whether the violent act was “intended to intimidate 
or coerce” the public, to “influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion,” or to “compel [the government] to do or abstain from doing any act”; 
or if it was otherwise politically motivated (p. 5). 
The tactic of suicide bombing, which is often associated with Arab Muslim 
groups, “has been practiced by a variety of terrorists, including secular terrorists,” and 
that definitions of terrorism throughout the 1980s and earlier, “appear to fit federal 
definitions of terrorism better than that of the 1990s and later” (p. 4).  It would be naïve 
and unreasonable to ignore the number of high profile cases of terrorism perpetrated by 
Arab or Muslim groups; however, “when publicly labeled instances of terrorism are 
disproportionately linked to Arab-Americans and/or Muslim-Americans, there may be an 
undue temptation to assume that the perpetrators of any new apparent act of terrorism are 
probably members of those groups” (p. 25). Thus, “reflexively labeling Arab- or Muslim-
American criminal suspects as terrorists, but not other suspects accused of similar 
conduct, creates a self-reinforcing loop. Each Arab or Muslim terrorist ‘confirms’ the 
(erroneous) public impression that while not all Arabs/Muslims are terrorists, all (or 
most) terrorists are Arabs/Muslims” (p. 26).  
Although it would be equally as naïve to claim terrorism committed by whites or 
non-Muslims was not labeled as such by the public, examples like Timothy McVeigh or 
“The Unabomber” Ted Kaczynski would appear to be exceptions to the rule—ones that 
might allow someone to “henceforth consider all terrorists to be Muslim, without being 
racist or bigoted” (p. 27). This self-reinforcing loop further reinforces cognitive biases, 
creating a priming effect about crimes perpetrated by “others” and leading to faulty 
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conclusions. “A fixation on Muslims as the only terrorists leads to an unhealthy feedback 
mechanism, whereby the government and public believe that efforts should be focused on 
the Muslim community, which in turn results in arrests that reinforce the initial belief” (p. 
28).31 
Regarding the ways in which terrorism-like violence is communicated to the 
public, it is important to consider that “events deemed ‘terrorist attacks,’ are often filtered 
through the lens of September 11” (DeFoster, 2010, p. 4). This suggests the public has 
been primed to consider acts of violence as acts of errorism only when committed by 
Muslims or individuals of Middle Eastern ancestry.32 People consume news media about 
acts of terrorism with pre-conceived notions about groups they see as outsiders and “are 
more likely to ascribe external responsibility for criminal events to white, in-group 
individuals in news coverage, and to ascribe internal, personal responsibility to non-
white, out-group individuals in news coverage” (p. 7). 
Excessive news coverage of certain events of violence or terrorism affects the 
public psychologically, too. The more people hear and talk about terrorism, the more 
likely they are to let emotion and fear, rather than reason, dictate their actions (West & 
Orr, pp. 93-105). This sort of irrationality behooves agencies looking to implement new 
anti-terrorism strategies and news organizations competing for viewers. Additionally, a 
                                                        
31 Yin cites the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, as one 
example of this type of cognitive bias. It was assumed Arab terrorists were responsible for the attack, 
arresting an Arab-American named Ibrahim Ahmad on suspicion of involvement. Even after Ahmad was 
released and authorities identified McVeigh and accomplice Terry Nichols as the perpetrators of the attack, 
some public figures and officials attempted to link t to former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. McVeigh’s 
lawyer also attempted to link the incident to Osama bin Laden and other Arab terrorists who were 
responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (p. 29). 
 
32 Despite news media’s deployment of pro-Muslim message  in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, 
fringe anti-Muslim organizations dominated mass media via displays of anger and fear, becoming 
mainstream in the process (Bail, 2012). Inattention o condemnations of violence from prominent Muslim 
organizations created “a very distorted” representation of the community of organizations and entities 
“competing to shape the representation of Islam in the American public sphere” (Clark, 2012). 
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by-product of such coverage results in increased levels of socio-political anxiety—an 
unintended consequence of the news selection process that could be considered one of the 
intended goals of terrorists (Traugott & Brader, 2003). Wittebols (1991) argues media 
coverage and analyses of terrorism are matters of hegemonic influence. News media 
classify acts of terrorism as either grievance or institutional terrorism.  
Grievance terrorism refers to the ways in which government sources utilize news 
media to establish agendas hostile to groups with interests in conflict with those of the 
United States. Institutional terrorism refers to attempts to decrease coverage and conceal 
the degree to which the United States supports repressive regimes. News coverage of 
terrorism often emphasizes grievance terrorism against the state and tends to ignore 
institutional terrorism (Brooten, 2006). In either case, the goal of the relationship between 
the government and news media is to create a narrative in which terrorism is a black-and-
white concept discussed within frameworks beneficial to government interests (p. 263). 
This distinction matters because “‘terrorist’ is the mother of all damning labels in this 
post-9/11 age. And beyond politics and public relations, ideas about what constitutes 
terrorism and who commits it can have a significant effect on law enforcement and court 
outcomes” (Krattenmaker, 2012). 
However, news coverage is not merely a matter of manifest text; any analysis of 
coverage of terrorism must also consider the latent cues news media organizations 
provide the audience through their methods of production. From a production standpoint, 
television media is far more engaging emotionally than any other medium (Cho, et al., 
2003); it is understood that audience interpretation of news varies considerably based on 
the method of consumption. The same story could be interpreted differently, depending 
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on the medium, so one could only imagine the impact the current stratified broadcast 
news landscape has on certain news stories. For example, a 2006 Washington Post study 
concluded that a person is more likely to consume pieces of news that come from sources 
coinciding with their preconceived opinions about the world (Manjoo, 2008). Viewers 
tend to choose media messages featuring values and opi ions consistent with their group 
memberships. Ultimately, this leads to specialized media environments in which people 
become defined by the media they consume rather than a shared national identity, uniting 
around a specific identification that can influence intergroup dynamics and tensions. 
Media content represents critical territory and identity battles between particular groups, 
reflecting group status and vitality and conveying societal values about diversity and 
intergroup relations. This conclusion also extends to election of entertainment content: 
individuals prefer television shows featuring in-group members or stars (Harwood & 
Roy, 2005).  
Perception is reality in the world of television news and the ways in which news 
stories are presented have profound effects on the ways in which information is 
interpreted and processed by the audience. Heavy television users experience greater 
emotional responses to news stories involving terrorism (Cho et al., 2003). Certain tropes 
of television news production (e.g., split screens, lead-in music, and interspersed footage) 
also evoke strong emotional responses in viewers; additionally, footage of the aftermath 
of the September 11 attacks generated retaliatory responses (Reynolds & Barnett, 2002, 
p. 19). Such presentation serves to promote and further the idea that within the United 
States, news coverage of terrorism is conveyed through a simplistic narrative of “Good 
vs. Evil” (Wittebols, 1991). 
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This binary narrative is problematic for Muslim-Americans, who have roundly 
rejected and condemned terrorism as a legitimate means of achieving socio-political 
goals. Despite claims by various U.S. politicians i the decade since September 11, “the 
terrorist threat posed by radicalized Muslim-Americans has been exaggerated” as “such 
communities often self-police—confronting those who express radical ideology or 
support for terrorism and communicating concerns about radical individuals to 
authorities”  (CNN Wire Staff, 2010a). According to a 2011 Pew Research Center study, 
there have been no signs of support for extremism in Muslim-American communities 
since its last survey of Muslim-Americans in 2007. More than 80 percent of Muslim-
Americans believe “suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians are 
never justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies” (p. 65). (This percentage is 
comparable with two of the largest Muslim-majority countries, Pakistan and Indonesia, 
both of which rejected suicide bombing and other violence against civilians by more than 
75 percent.) Such beliefs would also be consistent with an oft-quoted principle of Islamic 
theology that equates the murder of one person with the murder of all mankind.33 
  
                                                        
33 Qur’an 5:32 (Surat Al-Ma’idah) 
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CHAPTER III 
Method 
Sampling 
This qualitative research study was a textual analysis of 35 news clips from three 
U.S.-based cable news media organizations: MSNBC, CNN, and Fox News Channel. 
Using a Grounded Theory approach to conceptualize coverage vis-à-vis “otherness,” 
Muslim stereotypes, and anti-Muslim rhetoric, these clips were examined through a lens 
of political economy. Although a quantitative approach might have set each event against 
its counterpart in a more concrete manner vis-à-vis the explicit language used to describe 
the circumstances of each event or the stated motives of each suspect, a qualitative 
methodology was preferred to account for and organize the latent content present within 
each clip. In other words, to complement the explicit texts and examine the underlying 
tones and non-verbal cues present within each discussion and the ways in which each 
event was contextualized rhetorically vis-à-vis terrorism or notions of Islam as an “other” 
ideology allegedly antithetical to American socio-cultural norms. This content would 
refer to everything from the ways in which anchors  correspondents described or 
discussed each situation (e.g., cadence, incredulous tone of voice, facial expressions, etc.) 
to any anecdotal and descriptive information displayed on screen. These are significant 
cues that might go unaccounted for quantitatively, ven though they provide considerable 
context in regard to the construction of the socio-political narrative of each event.  
MSNBC, CNN, and Fox News are the predominant U.S. cable news channels 
currently available, providing news information and commentary to millions of 
Americans every day (Pew Research, 2009). They also present news through particular 
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socio-political lenses (or at the very least, tend to attract certain types of viewers), with 
Fox News and MSNBC purportedly representing conservative and liberal viewpoints, 
respectively (DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2006; Steinberg, 2007), and CNN acting as relatively 
left-leaning moderate (Weatherly et al., 2007).34 It was important to observe the ways in 
which each network reported each incident and the alleged suspects during the first stages 
of crisis coverage, when information was scant, as well as when the nature of the 
newsgathering process yielded more information in the subsequent days following each 
incident (i.e., during the second and third stages of coverage).35  
News clips were gathered from the official websites of each network 
(MSNBC.com; CNN.com; and FoxNews.com), as well as from the official YouTube 
channels of each network, YouTube.com, and the “TV News Archive” website.36 As 
Graber’s (2006) explanation of the three stages of crisis coverage provided an additional 
framework in which to examine these events, timeliness served as the basis for clip 
selection: three “breaking news” and six “analysis” clips were used from each network.37 
The date and categorization of these clips was determin d by noting either the upload 
                                                        
34 Despite various polls indicating CNN as a channel with a just-left-of-center bias, it is still one ofthe most 
recognized and established broadcast news organizations in the world, and has seniority amongst the thr e 
networks in terms of cultural relevance. 
 
35 In the event of extraordinary phenomena or violence (e.g., natural disaster, terrorism, school shooting, 
etc.), news organizations report information in three stages. During the first stage of “crisis coverag ,” 
information is reported to facilitate the relief eforts and is limited primarily to descriptions of the incident. 
During the second stage, news coverage focuses on making sense of the situation. It is during the third and 
final stage that news media organizations attempt to quantify the incident within a greater perspective 
(Graber, 2006). 
 
36 The TV News Archive (archive.org/details/tv) is part of The Internet Archive project—a non-profit 
website that attempts to collect and transcribe various television clips for use by the public, including 
researchers, scholars, and historians. 
 
37 The only exception to this parameter will be found i  MSNBC’s coverage of the Federal Reserve bomb 
plot. Using the aforementioned channels, the research r was unable to find any “breaking news” clips of 
MSNBC’s coverage from the day of the sting. 
 52
date, readily apparent on-screen information (e.g., news ticker, “breaking news” lower 
third graphics, etc.), or through context clues provided by anchors or guests over the 
course of a broadcast (e.g., “yesterday’s attack,” “last week’s shooting,” etc.). Coverage 
was categorized as “breaking news” if, and only if, it was broadcast as the event occurred 
(or as information became immediately available during the day); similarly, coverage was 
categorized as “analysis” if it was broadcast in the subsequent days after the event 
occurred (up to one week). Care was given to ensure the selected clips focused on a 
general discussion of each incident and later, the identity and possible motivations of the 
suspect. 
Data Collection 
Collection and examination of the data occurred from approximately March 2011 
to approximately November 2012. Thirty-five total clips were watched for the purpose of 
this research; for each incident, three “breaking news” and six “analysis” clips were 
examined. The 11 total “breaking news” clips were chosen based on the ability to provide 
information about the situation (as it happened or as information became available in 
real-time) or the alleged suspect, as well as information about the relationship between 
the alleged suspect and the incident (i.e., a cursory evaluation of the reasons behind the 
event’s occurrence). The remaining 24 “analysis” clips were chosen based on the ability 
to place each incident within greater socio-political and historical frameworks, as well as 
the ability to understand and explain “why” or “how” they happened—at least, according 
to news anchors, guests, or reporters/correspondents (i.e., a deliberate discussion about 
the reasons behind the event; the motivation of the suspect; and the ways in which it did 
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or did not relate to a previous incident). These clips were transcribed and then imported 
into NVivo software for coding.  
The code strategy focused primarily on instances in which concepts or references 
relating to terrorism or religion were mentioned or not mentioned by news anchors, 
reporters, special correspondents (e.g., foreign policy fficials, terrorism experts, etc.) or 
other guests (former co-workers, family members, witnesses, etc.) during a broadcast. 
These concepts and references included any mention of the September 11 attacks; the 
words “terrorism” or “terrorist;” Al-Qaeda; “radical Islam” (or people often associated 
with “radical Islam”); Islam or Muslims; and words such as “jihad” or “infidel.” Codes 
were also taken for concepts and references to the mental health of the suspects, as well 
as for concepts and references to their manifest or latent political affiliations or beliefs 
and the use or misuse of hyperbole to describe each situation or suspect. 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
The key strengths in the design of this research exist in the multitude of clips 
available for review and the wealth of information about racial disparities present in 
contemporary news and popular media. The 24-hour news media networks provide a 
plethora of information; however, this also is a weakness, as clips are sometimes filled 
with content irrelevant to the main topic of discussion. Additionally, there are too many 
clips to analyze in order to get the most accurate esults, though the researcher did 
attempt to reach theoretical saturation as best as pos ible. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Findings 
Although the methodology of this research was based on the common thread 
shared by these four incidents, a more efficient strategy for this section might be to 
describe coverage of analogous events. Therefore, cv rage of the Ft. Hood shooting will 
be compared to coverage of the Tucson shooting and similarly, coverage of the Federal 
Reserve bomb plot will be compared to coverage of the Austin plane crash. Further, as 
the fundamental premise of this research is the notio  that acts of violence committed by 
Muslims are reported by news media within different frameworks than those committed 
by non-Muslims, the Ft. Hood rampage and Federal Reserv  bomber incident will serve 
as the focal points of discussion, with the Tucson rampage and Austin plane crash serving 
as loci of comparative analysis. 
Ft. Hood Rampage 
Comparing the Ft. Hood and Tucson shootings, it appe rs as though only the Ft. 
Hood incident was contextualized as “an attack,” with Hasan framed largely as a thin-
skinned fanatic fueled by his religious beliefs rather than as a mentally ill individual. 
Contrarily, the Tucson incident was contextualized as an isolated act of gun violence, 
with Loughner framed largely as a mentally disturbed young man whose political 
affiliation was unknown. Whereas Loughner’s actions were discussed within a 
framework of mental illness (or at the very least, sociopathic behavior) and partisan 
political rhetoric, Hasan’s actions were both explicitly and implicitly contextualized to 
have been inspired in part by his religious and religio-political beliefs, which were 
reported to be within the Islamic tradition. 
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Breaking news of the Ft. Hood incident progressively uncovered various pieces of 
information about Hasan’s identity and possible motivation, with early reports suggesting 
he had been killed in the subsequent gunfight. With information about the suspected 
shooter and the casualties sparse and (relatively) unconfirmed, anchors, reporters, and 
analysts attempted to contextualize the magnitude of the rampage. Fox News, for 
example, reported that Ft. Hood was the largest active duty post in the United States, 
surrounding approximately 340-square feet and capable of supporting two full-armored 
divisions. Fox News also noted the rampage began ner the base’s readiness center, 
where soldiers are processed and prepared to be deployed overseas, adding, “the loss of 
12 soldiers on a U.S. military post on American soil, practically unprecedented.”38  
CNN’s breaking news coverage revealed Hasan had expressed to others that he 
was under a substantial amount of stress in the days prior to the rampage: 
We’ve also learned from Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison that the alleged 
shooter was about to be deployed to Iraq and that he was unhappy about that. She 
also said that in the shooting he was targeting peopl  that he knew. Also, his 
cousin has told some media that Hasan was born and r ised here in the U.S. and 
was a “good American.” He said he never expressed tendencies like these but 
that he did get “flak for being Middle Eastern” and was harassed by some in the 
military.39 
 After airing a portion of an address by President Barack Obama, in which he 
described the event as a “horrific outburst of violence” and also evoked the seemingly 
                                                        
38 National correspondent Steve Centanni, reporting from the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. 
 
39 CNN correspondent Randi Kaye. 
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(and seemingly understood) inherent sanctity of “American soil,”40 Fox News reported 
information about the other alleged suspects and then broke the news of Hasan’s identity. 
Based on information it had received in the midst of c verage, Fox News initially 
dismissed the idea that Hasan was distressed or mentally ill, noting the methodology of 
the rampage suggested a calculated effort. Retired A my Major General and Fox News 
correspondent Bob Scales, reporting to network anchor Bret Baier: 
Right, Bret, what I heard was, this was a very—this was not the act of a crazy. 
This was a very deliberate act. Uh, it was, it was very precise execution style is 
what one soldier told me—that this particular army major went about his 
business with great precision. So, it wasn’t just a random act of violence or 
apparently not just some soldier, um, you know, uh, being affected by something 
like Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Instead, this was a—this was a deliberate act 
of execution. 
Moments later, Scales amended this statement, saying he did not believe the 
incident was an act of terrorism or that Hasan was mentally unstable: 
Well, I think the first thing that came to my mind as, I guess, most soldiers who 
have been overseas would attest to is, uh, that it would be an act of terrorism. 
Because after all, uh, Ft. Hood is the largest force projection post in the army, so 
it would be a natural place for a terrorist to commit an act of this sort—but I 
don’t think there’s any evidence that this is, that this is a terrorist act. And the 
second suspicion, of course, is that it’s the act of a guy who’s a nut and it doesn’t 
appear to be that either. So, we’ll have to wait and see how all this plays out. 
                                                        
40 President Obama: “These are men and women who have m d  the selfless and courageous decision to 
risk and, at times, give their lives to protect us on a daily basis. It’s difficult enough when we lose these 
brave Americans in battles overseas; it is horrifying that they should come under fire on American soil.” 
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 Speaking with former FBI profiler Clint Van Zandt, MSNBC’s Ed Schultz 
inquired about Hasan’s psychological state, wonderig about his profession as an Army 
psychiatrist and if he had internalized the multitude of traumatic stories from other 
soldiers. Van Zandt, at first, suggested that Hasan might have very well “succumbed to 
that which he was supposed to heal,” quoting the Biblical proverb, “Physician heal 
thyself.”41 However, he quickly dismissed this notion, asserting hat Hasan had a method 
to his madness and (rather subtly) alluding to the concept of a “suicide bomber:” 
In a situation like this, Ed, you—you cannot believe that he expected to get away 
with this. It looks to me like some terrible statement that he was making in the 
midst of his own personal suicide. In essence, we may find out that he well 
planned to die in doing this by making whatever horrible statement he did by 
taking all these other lives. 
Making an appeal to (his own) authority and experience as a former FBI operative 
and a former counselor, Van Zandt concluded that although the idea he had over-
empathized with his patients was plausible, the scope and scale of Hasan’s rampage 
suggested something else—something strong—must have served as his principle 
motivation: 
Well, number one: I’ve experienced Post Traumatic Stress as an FBI agent. I’ve 
been through it, and I was also a Post Traumatic Stress counselor. And many 
times, there is a cumulative effect of this, Ed, where one incident may or may not 
cause that. But it may be something that happened i his life or…yourself in his 
place, where he was listening to men and women come in and tell about the 
horrific situations they were involved in—that, in itself, could have lent some 
                                                        
41 Luke 4:23 
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psychological weight to what he was doing. But there’s still gotta be some other 
reason than just beyond a terrible statement. There’s gotta be something beyond 
him that allowed him, that caused him, to act out like this, Ed.  
Following his conversation with Van Zandt, Schultz welcomed to the program 
Texas Congressman John Carter, whose district includes Ft. Hood, to provide new 
information about the situation on the ground. At the ime of this coverage, Hasan (who 
was still believed to have been killed) was the only suspect officially identified by the 
local authorities; it was still unknown as to whether or not he had been the only shooter, 
although other possible suspects were questioned and the  released, according to Carter. 
None of these other possible suspects, however, were id ntified in any way.  
Schultz then welcomed NBC News terrorism analyst Roger Cressey, who 
reiterated the information about other suspects that Carter had just stated, speculating on 
the possible ways in which authorities might or might not address the situation (i.e., a 
rather banal conversation that could have, arguably, happened with any other member of 
NBC News or MSNBC’s team of correspondents): 
SCHULTZ: Joining me now is NBC News terrorism analyst Roger Cressey. 
Roger, uh, your thoughts on that new information that we just got from John 
Carter. Now there…this is the first time, I believe, that we’ve reported there were 
four people involved uh…a shooter who is dead, two suspects were picked up and 
a third suspect, two have been released and one is still in custody. This is the 
picture of the shooter, Army Major Malik Hasan, who was shot and killed by 
civilian police on the scene after taking the lives of 12 people and injuring 31 
others. Roger, your thoughts on this most recent information? 
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CRESSEY: Well, Ed, we’re probably gonna see additional individuals being 
brought in for questioning for probably two reasons: one is individuals who 
associated with, uh, Major Hasan, who might have known him to find out what 
was he thinking, what was he talking about in the hours leading up to this terrible 
act and second, whether or not there are any other individuals who might be, uh, 
under suspicion. So I think both of those are possibilities right now. 
 
SCHULTZ: And to clarify, that interview that I just had with Congressman 
Carter, that is his information, NBC News has not confirmed that, but 
Congressman Carter telling us that the two suspects have been released and there 
is another one that is in custody, so we will obviously follow up on that. There is 
supposed to be a press conference coming up, you’re seeing a live shot of the 
press conference at the post at Ft. Hood and we’ll bring that to you. Roger, this is 
obviously going to follow up with a very intense investigation that will be 
overseen by the military, but the chances of new regulations and new safeguards 
putting in place in the world that we live in right now in the wake of this, I 
imagine, would be very good. 
 
CRESSEY: There’s no doubt, because even if this was an isolated incident, 
there’ll be lessons learned from it of applicability across the military, so those 
lessons will be applied and you’ll see additional measures come out as a result of 
the investigation. 
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SCHULTZ: Just recapping here tonight, our coverage, w ’re awaiting a live 
press conference. This man, Army Major Malik Hasan, today walked into the 
facility at the post at Ft. Hood, at the soldier ready processing center, which was, 
uh, a graduation was about to take place and opened fir  with two handguns, 
killing 12 people. Our coverage will continue, that’s our show, a breaking…a 
break in news continues here with “Hardball” on MSNBC. 
Although details were scarce (as later reports indicated Hasan was, in fact, alive), 
it appeared as though the fundamental, foundational narrative of the Ft. Hood shooting 
was established: something other than mental illness had caused Hasan to open fire and 
target his fellow soldiers—the same people to whom e was entrusted to provide care and 
support. As the story continued to develop over the following days, allegations of mental 
illness were, for lack of a better description, dismissed or downplayed contextually in 
favor of allegations that suggested Hasan had becom “radicalized” due to his religious 
beliefs. Using such evocative language as “jihadism” and “attack” to describe the 
massacre and drawing parallels to other incidents—particularly the terrorist attacks of 
September 11—some anchors, guests, and correspondents appeared quick to downplay 
allegations of mental illness and instead, contextualized Hasan’s actions as representing 
an attack on the United States and Americans, as opposed to an isolated incident. There 
also appeared to be a political (or otherwise socio-ide logical) element present during 
analysis coverage, as some news anchors and guests attempted to discredit the coverage 
provided by the other networks. 
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CNN’s Anderson Cooper, addressing Michigan Congressman and member of the 
House Intelligence committee Pete Hoekstra: 
This week, your office issued a statement in which you said the shootings are, 
“…a tragic reminder of the potential deadly consequnces of the threat posed by 
homegrown jihadism, and the failure of the governmet to adequately respond to 
it.” Do you believe the government failed in regards to this attack? 
Cooper later asked:  
CNN has learned that intelligence officials actually had Hasan on their 
radar…they even intercepted but later dismissed communications that he sent to a 
radical Islamic cleric. I mean, do you think the government dropped the ball 
here? 
Hoekstra expressed dissatisfaction with the way in which information about the breadth 
and depth of Hasan’s alleged radicalization was shared between intelligence agencies and 
legislative officials. After a rather detailed explanation from Hoekstra, describing exactly 
when and how the information was delivered to the House Intelligence committee, he 
gave his opinion as to whether or not the incident should be considered an act of 
terrorism. While hesitant to jump to any concrete conclusions about the incident, given 
the information available at the time, Hoekstra disregarded the idea that Hasan might 
have suffered from any distress or mental illness. 
HOEKSTRA:…I think we gotta be very, very careful about jumping to conclusions 
until we have all of the information. I do believe th re’s indications here that this 
is more of an act of terrorism than just a criminal act or someone cracking. This 
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might give us a little more insights into how these kinds of individuals become 
radicalized. 
 The conversation then turned to the issue of “jihadism,” which appeared to be a 
special sub-category of terrorism:  
COOPER: Do you see, when you say “an act of terrorism”—and you describe it 
as “homegrown jihadism” before—um…do you see potentially, I mean, in that, in 
that definition, do you also see this possibility that this guy not having connection 
with a foreign group or others, but just, ideologically motivated, deciding to do 
this by himself? 
 
HOEKSTRA: I think if, if you take a look at the strategy that radical jihadists are 
using—their use of the internet, their use of, you know, mass communications 
tools that are available to them—this is exactly what they’re trying to create. 
Individuals willing to go out, you know, give them the education off of their 
websites, give them the motivation, then allow these people creatively to develop 
their own tactic as to how they will carry out (cough)—excuse me—a jihadist 
activity or jihadist event in their site, in their community. 
Cooper then aired a clip of General George Casey, who emphasized the importance of 
avoiding speculation about Hasan’s motives: 
CASEY: You can’t jump to conclusions now based on little snippets of information 
that come out…I’m concerned that this increased speculation could cause a 
backlash against some of our Muslim soldiers. 
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The conversation ended with Cooper and Hoekstra verifying the validity of Casey’s 
statement. 
 The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer aired an interview by CNN Chief Medical 
Correspondent Dr. Sanjay Gupta with Ft. Hood victim Logan Burnette, an Army 
Specialist. Summarizing his interview, Gupta said many people tend to forget certain 
details when they have experienced a traumatic event, but Burnette remembered 
everything in “fine detail.” Gupta appeared to ask Burnette questions about the rampage 
in a manner similar to that of a police detective, bluntly asking Burnette, “Did you see the 
guy?” With an almost-distant look on his face, Burnette provided Gupta with a vivid, but 
otherwise cold, description of the incident: 
 BURNETTE: First thing I saw were the laser sights on his, uh, handgun. 
  
GUPTA: You noticed the laser sights. 
 
BURNETTE: Yup. 
 
GUPTA: What did he look like? I mean, what was he, was he, did he look angry? 
Did he look mad and… 
 
BURNETTE: Serious and intent. He stood up, screamed, “Allah akbar,” and then 
just started shooting. 
 
GUPTA: He screamed, “Allah akbar.” 
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BURNETTE: He did. Top of his lungs… 
 
GUPTA: “God is great…” 
 
BURNETTE: Yup… 
 
GUPTA: In, in the Muslim language. 
 
BURNETTE: Right… 
Burnette said the rampage caught people off-guard, as the soldiers in the room 
were going over clinical reviews and that no one had even noticed Hasan until he stood 
up and opened fire “like a pop-up target.” He added that Hasan was “reloading and firing 
again, and reloading and firing again,” to which Gupta replied, “against defenseless 
soldiers.” Burnette also recalled the horror of seeing blood splatter all over the room and 
fellow soldiers in pain from their wounds, “It’s a pretty hard thing to see—and not have 
any way of defending yourself.” It also was hard to deal with the breach of trust and 
broken bonds that were a result of the rampage, he said.  
 Fox News’ tone was observably less diplomatic with some of its analysis 
coverage. Discussing the potential legal and punitive consequences for Hasan with the 
hosts of Fox & Friends, Senior Judicial Analyst Judge Andrew Napolitano emphasized 
the importance of evidence that would indicate the rampage was pre-meditated: 
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If, for example, he just snapped with no plan or plot, no contemplation—he can’t 
be executed no matter how much damage he caused and no matter how many 
innocents he killed, because capital murder requires planning, plotting, pre-
meditation, and targeting. In terms of treason: treason is defined as waging war 
on the United States of America. That would depend, again, on what was in his 
brain when he, when he pulled this trigger. 
Host Gretchen Carlson then asked if Hasan’s alleged internet activity (presumably, his 
correspondence with radical clerics overseas), if true, would constitute as pre-meditation, 
putting her hand on her chin in a contemplative manner. 
NAPOLITANO: Oh, sure. If he, if he, had two handguns o  his person, which his 
highly unusual… 
 
 MALE VOICE (OFF-CAMERA): Right there! 
 
NAPOLITANO: …that would be considered, uh, pre-meditation. So, it really 
depends on what the facts are. 
 Napolitano then explained the potential jurisdictions and punitive histories of the 
state of Texas and the military, respectively. He also agreed with host Peter Johnson 
when he said he felt information about the rampage was “limited,” to which Carlson 
opined that law enforcement officials might intentio ally withhold information to 
preserve the integrity of an open case. Johnson then remarked, somewhat incredulously, 
about the potential efficacy of an “insanity defens” from Hasan: 
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JOHNSON: Two, two quick questions on this, on this p ony insanity defense, in 
my opinion, that’s being built up at this point: Is fear of deployment, uh, to Iraq 
or Afghanistan, is that insanity defense? 
 
NAPOLITANO: I can’t imagine that it would be. He, he would have to—here’s 
how insane he would have to be: He would have to think t at they were shooting 
at him. Or he would have to think he was shooting at a sack of potatoes rather 
than a human being, that’s how depraved his mind would have to be, and a jury 
would have to believe that, in order to find him insa e.  
The theory the rampage was pre-meditated was echoed during an episode of The 
O’Reilly Factor. Speaking with host Bill O’Reilly, author and retid Army Lt. Colonel 
Ralph Peters bluntly referred to the rampage as being of the same magnitude as the 
September 11 attacks and placed blame squarely on the ideology of “radical Islam” (if 
not Islam, in general) and an overemphasis on political correctness: 
PETERS: Bill, we just need to get a grip on this and put it in perspective. Very 
straightforward: What happened yesterday at Ft. Hood was the worst terrorist 
attack on American soil since 9-11. It was committed by a Muslim fanatic who 
shouted, “Allah is Great,” and gunned down 44 unarmed innocent soldiers and 
civilians. And our president tells us not to rush to judgment, to wait until all the 
facts are in. What facts are we waiting for? This was an Islamist terrorist act and, 
I’m sorry if it’s inconvenient for Washington to face the facts, but there’s no 
question about it: It was a terrorist act. It was committed by an Islamist; we knew 
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he was an Islamist—military did nothing about it out f political correctness. So, 
Bill, what am I missing? 
 On the topic of Hasan’s mental state at the time of the rampage, O’Reilly’s 
language appeared to equate terrorism and terroristic endeavors as fundamental to the 
“Muslim cause.” Neither O’Reilly nor Peters appeared to specify any differences between 
“radical” Islam (and related terms like “Islamist”) and what would be considered to be 
“moderate,” or otherwise non-violent, Islam. O’Reilly’s language (specifically, his use of 
the term “rabid Muslim”) and method of questioning appeared to be indicative of that: 
O’REILLY: Okay, let me tell you what, what you might be missing—because I’m 
not disagreeing with you because I simply don’t know—but I think there is a 
possibility that while this guy was a rabid Muslim and obviously sympathetic to 
the Muslim cause—whatever it was in his mind—okay? There is a possibility this 
guy was so troubled personally, that he just snapped. And that the Muslim thing 
wasn’t the primary motivator for him killing all of those people. Now, I think we’ll 
learn whether, what your theory, is right or whether the snap theory is right, from 
his computer analysis, which they’re doing now. 
 Peters immediately discredited the idea Hasan suffered from any extraordinary 
mental illness, making (what appeared to be) a rathe  overt theological statement about 
the fundamental beliefs of terrorists and the fundamental beliefs of what could be 
described as “non-terrorists:” 
Bill, I don’t think there’s any contradiction. I mean terrorists, by definition, are 
not by nature happy campers. Suicide bombers aren’t necessarily from the middle 
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of the belt curve. There are a lot of crazy people who become terrorists and 
terrorist masterminds play on them… 
O’Reilly then stated the key difference, in his opinion, between a terrorist and a normal 
criminal (or rather, someone who acted violently due to either emotion or mental illness):  
O’REILLY:…But, but, but—a snap is more of a spontaneous act, you see. Now, if 
they can prove that this guy planned this out for weeks, then he’s a terrorist, as I 
said in a “Talking Points Memo.” 
 
PETERS: Bill, he, he, he, he acquired the weapons, that takes a couple days. He 
gave away his possessions…basically closed his apartment. He clearly was 
planning it for at least several days. It was a cold-b ooded act, it wasn’t a crime 
of passion—you know, a husband coming home and discovering his wife in bed 
with her girlfriend. This was something very, very different. It was a terrorist act. 
Now, you don’t have to be plugged directly into Al-Qaeda to be an Islamist 
terrorist… 
The tone of Peters’ language became increasingly polemic at this point, as he 
derided not only the Obama administration for its political correctness,42 but also the 
“lamestream media” for its failure to objectively report (and thus, validate) Hasan’s 
connections to Islamist terror networks.43  O’Reilly appeared to agree with Peters’ 
                                                        
42 “Look, this guy was a nutcase, but he was also an Islamist extremist. I want our president to take a 
stand—stop this, ‘Oh, there is no Islamist terrorism.’ Ft. Hood: The new 9-11 act of Islamist terrorism on 
our soil. Let’s be honest about it.” 
 
43 “…What troubles me beyond the fact that this was a terrorist act and the media—the mainstream, 
lamestream media—won’t deal with it as such. It troubles me that our army has become so politically 
correct that they didn’t get rid of this guy.” 
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assessment, promoting the journalistic integrity of F x News and dismissing the idea 
Hasan committed his actions due to any stress or mental illness: 
The only network and maybe, the only program discussing how the media is 
covering this mass murder, is Fox. And “The Factor”—and maybe somebody will 
do it later on—um, but you’re not going to this kind of analysis in any of the other 
media, they’re not gonna do it. So that, the American people, unless they’re tuned 
into us—increasingly more and more are—not gonna hear any of this. It’s gonna 
be a total blackout that they’ve had that, you know, it’s “Post Traumatic 
Stress…” that caused the guy to do it. I mean, crazy stuff like that. 
Peters scoffed at the idea Hasan had experienced any extraordinary harassment because 
of his ethnicity or religious affiliation and subsequently “snapped” because of it, saying, 
“Good God, every soldier goes through a little harassment.” Peters added that even if 
someone had harassed him due to his ethnicity or religious beliefs, the military would be 
quick to terminate the offender’s career. He also refer ed to Hasan as a longtime 
“troublemaker” and “sad sack” who was not discharged earlier “because he was part of a 
protected species, a protected minority.” The interview concluded with Peters, again, 
deriding mainstream media’s coverage of the incident and the Obama administration’s 
failure to respond to it adequately: 
No, it’s time to get rid of the “P.C.” culture in the Army, in society, in the media 
and Bill, I believe your viewers understand that this was an act of Islamist terror. 
And the media’s not gonna fool them and President Obama’s not gonna fool them 
and at some point, we need to stop focusing on, “Oh, how tormented this poor 
Major Hasan was,” and remember what—how many of the names do we know of 
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the dead? What about the names of the wounded? Havethe media covered the 
family lives that’ve been destroyed? The lives have be n destroyed? No, it’s all 
about “poor Major Hasan” and I am ready to puke. 
Comparatively, MSNBC’s analysis coverage was observably more tactful than 
Fox News’ coverage. Host Alex Witt first read a statement from Hasan’s brother, Eyad, 
who said he always knew Hasan to be peaceful and “he has never committed an act of 
violence and was always known to be a good, law-abiding citizen.” She was then joined 
via satellite by Hasan’s uncle, Rafiq Hasan, who echo d Eyad’s statement, saying Hasan 
chose psychiatry because he wanted to help people and fainted at the sight of blood. 
When asked if the nature and rigors of his profession caused him to lash out, Rafiq said 
Hasan was particularly empathetic toward people andsometimes cried about the 
conditions of his patients, adding, “This is not the Nidal we know. Something 
happened…”  
Witt acknowledged Rafiq’s claims and then asked about Hasan’s religiosity and 
his feelings about being sent to Iraq: 
WITT: Some suggest that this came from his religion, that there was a 
conflicted…can you tell me the kind of devout Muslim that he was and if this may 
have bothered him—being deployed to Iraq? 
 
RAFIQ: No, I don’t think religion has much to do with t, as far I know. I think, if 
something bother him—I don’t know for sure what bothered him. But if something 
bothered him the way I see it—the suffering of his patient and, uh, he was really 
in pain and he suffers as much as they did--and maybe that’s one of the reason, 
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uh, but there is nothing to do with the religion. As far we know, the Islam, it’s to 
help anybody; this is one of the Islam rules—if somebody need help you have to 
help him. If he’s sick you have to help him—even if he’s your worst enemy—
because this is Islam. So I don’t think anything has to do with his religion. I think 
it is something… 
 
WITT: No, it’s very true—the Muslim religion is, is known to be very peace 
loving, outside the extremist views, sir. 
Again, Witt asked about Hasan’s thoughts about being sent to Iraq and reports that said 
he had attempted to hire a lawyer. Rafiq said he had only heard such reports second-hand, 
reiterating that Hasan was empathetic toward his patients and a “sensitive, emotional 
man.” Witt then asked Rafiq to shed light on allegations claiming Hasan was frustrated 
due to being harassed about his faith:  
RAFIQ: Yes, not in this space, he mention a few times he was harassed. His 
response was, you know, these people—excuse me for y language—ignorant or 
they don’t know. It hurt him, but didn’t make him very upset at the time… 
 
WITT: …But Mr. Hasan, I want to make it clear, sir, you just said he was not 
harassed by people on the base, but by others outside the base? 
 
RAFIQ: No, no—I’m, I’m saying the base where this incident happened. Because 
I didn’t see nor did I hear from him when he was in that base. But before, when he 
was in the Washington area, he mentioned that something that sometime, one 
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incident, they put a diaper in his car and say, “This is your head-dress.” Another 
time, they draw camel, say, “camel jockey;” they were making some fun. But it 
upset him that much and, uh, what happened, I really til now, I, I’m in denial—I 
don’t believe he can do that. One time, he has a bird and that bird died, he 
mourned, he cried for three months. I don’t know he’s capable of doing it… 
The interview concluded with Rafiq expressing his “deepest sympathy” and support for 
the families of the victims. He said Hasan was a loving man who loved his country, 
adding he did not know how Hasan could commit such an act and if he really had, that he 
hoped an investigation would discover what caused him to do it. 
 MSNBC’s diplomatic approach toward analysis coverag  was on display, again, 
during host Rachel Maddow’s brief interview with Suhail Khan of CAIR—the Council 
on American-Islamic Relations. In what could be described as a meta-analysis of the 
ways in which news media had covered the Ft. Hood rampage, Maddow noted the 
apparent disregard for comments that called for pragmatism:   
Even as the FBI and the commanding officer at Ft. Hood have said that the 
evidence does not necessarily suggest that this is an act of terrorism or should be 
viewed that way, the arguably premature discussion about terrorism and whether 
or not our military has been infiltrated—it’s happening not only in 
WorldNetDaily Wingnutville, it’s happening all over the place, even in the 
mainstream media. 
She then noted and inquired about the apparent disparity between news coverage and 
public opinion of Ft. Hood and another shooting that had occurred in Orlando, Florida: 
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You know, Suhail, there was another horrible mass shooting today, this one was 
in an Orlando office building. Police say, in that case, the alleged gunman opened 
fire at a company he had been fired from a couple of years ago. Of course, in that 
case, no one is talking about that as an incident of terrorism. Do you think the 
contrast in the speculation about the motives in these shootings is important? 
Obviously, the timing appears to be purely coincidental, but is it instructive in 
terms of the different ways these have been responded to? 
The interview concluded with Khan expressing his disgust with the ways in which some 
people and media organizations used the incident to further their respective political 
goals. 
Tucson Rampage 
 In contrast to coverage of the Ft. Hood rampage, in which mental illness was 
generally dismissed as the reason behind Hasan’s actions, the overall narrative of the 
Tucson massacre seemed to be constructed around the no ion that Loughner was 
psychologically disturbed and might not have been fully cognizant of his actions. 
Although mentioned briefly, the possibility Loughner was influenced by an ideology did 
not become a topic of discussion until later. As the perpetrator, Loughner was discussed 
separately from the ideologies to which he was allegedly subscribed. Like Ft. Hood, 
breaking news of the incident revealed various details about the casualties and potential 
suspects. Soon after Loughner was taken into police custody and identified, CNN’s 
Jeanne Meserve revealed information about Loughner’s alleged internet activity, which 
included numerous YouTube videos and “rambling” and “i coherent” posts on various 
online forums and message boards: 
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(The postings)…indicate some unhappiness with the U.S. government, co cerns 
with the currency system and also, with the U.S. constitution. Let me give you 
some samples, in one, entitled “this student at pima community college,” he says 
every police officer in the United States, as of now, is unconstitutionally working. 
Pima Community College police are police in the United States, therefore, Pima 
Community College police are unconstitutionally working, the police are 
unconstitutionally working. As you can see, a little bit different, a little bit 
unusual, hard to make exact sense of what he’s trying to get across here. Uh, but 
it does indicate something about the issues of concern to him…And in another, 
called “introduction Jared Loughner,” it begins: “My final thoughts, Jared 
Loughner.” 
Meserve continued, providing information about Loughner’s thoughts about the concept 
of terrorism and its use as a political tool: 
Also, one I wanted to bring your attention to, in which he talks about terrorism, 
he says, “If I define terrorist, then a terrorist is a person who employs terrorism, 
especially as a political weapon; I define terrorist. Thus, a terrorist is a person 
who employs terrorism, especially as a political weapon. If you call me a 
terrorist, then the argument to call me a terrorist i  ad hominem; you call me a 
terrorist, thus, the argument to call me a terrorist, if ad hominem.” So, rambling, 
difficult to understand but obviously, indicating some unhappiness with the state 
of, of affairs vis-à-vis the police, the constitution—he even talks about grammar. 
Despite this information, Meserve emphasized that law enforcement officials did not 
believe the rampage was, in any way, associated with terrorism. The segment concluded 
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with Blitzer reiterating the facts about Loughner’s “very disturbing, very 
disturbing…rambling” notes on the internet. 
Fox News correspondent Doug McKelway provided an update about the 
condition of Giffords and noted comments from high-profile politicians who wished for 
her speedy recovery. He also addressed Loughner’s alleged internet activity and anti-
government views, saying Loughner “had thoughts and expressions that were so clearly 
beyond the range of normal thinking and rationality:” 
His favorite books included “Mein Kampf,” “The Communist Manifesto,” 
“Animal Farm”—one, in one of his writings, he said, “The government is 
employing mind control and brainwash on the people by controlling grammar.” 
That, that’s just one little snippet of a large arry of wildly bizarre, perhaps 
psychotic, ramblings. He posted a video of himself on YouTube, apparently posing 
as the grim reaper—at least as some other eerie, masked figure. 
Drawing a parallel to the mass shooting at Virginia Tech University in 2007, McKelway 
said Loughner’s actions would “undoubtedly renew the debate over…access to guns by 
people who have mental problems. Both sides in the gun control debate have advocated 
bans on gun ownership by people who have a history of mental instability.” 
In inverse relation to O’Reilly and Peters’ discussion about Hasan’s motives and 
the ills caused by the political correctness of the “liberal media,” MSNBC host Keith 
Olbermann and guest Mark Potok of the Southern Poverty Law Center ascribed 
Loughner’s motives and actions to radical right-wing philosophies. Loughner seemed to 
be “quite mad” and “out of his mind,” according to P tok: 
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But there is a thread through the (internet) material that really seems pretty clear; 
that thread has to do with seeing the government as an enemy. The books you 
mentioned, there's a theme that runs through all of them, the idea of the individual 
against the state. There are ideas like the idea of the only legitimate currency 
being backed by gold and silver. The idea, weirdly enough, of controlling 
grammar—of somehow the government using grammar to control the people—is 
an idea that exists on the radical right. 
He added, “it is not entirely surprising…that someon  like this acts out,” given “the 
amazing level of vitriol out there on the airwaves.” Citing Loughner’s alleged internet 
activity and early statements from local authorities, Potok said it was clear Loughner’s 
intended target was Giffords and his rampage was meant to be “a political act, at least in 
some way.” In Potok’s estimation, Loughner, like many other individuals at the time, 
seemed to have been a victim of “very hot” right-wing rhetoric: 
I think it's worth remembering, what? About a year ago, when that fellow, Joseph 
Stack, flew an airplane into the IRS building in Austin; it's the same kind of thing. 
He may well have been mentally ill. He had been influe ced by the tax protesters 
on the radical right. We’ve seen this again and again—the episode of bricks being 
thrown through Congress peoples' windows, democratic headquarters and so on. 
When asked if derisive political language—irrespectiv  of its direction—absolved such 
disturbed individuals from responsibility, Potok said there is “no exoneration for the 
people who…repeat these kinds of falsehoods on the air and in public squares.” Further, 
that it was “entirely natural that some people out there who are disturbed” could hear 
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some of the socio-economic and political theories espoused by conservative media and 
then be inspired to act upon them. 
 Thus, breaking news coverage established the fundamental narrative of the 
Tucson rampage: An unfortunate incident carried out by a disturbed young man who 
might or might not have been influenced by radical right-wing ideologies or fringe socio-
political conspiracies. Although early evidence suggested Loughner’s rampage was pre-
meditated and ideologically motivated—two critical elements asserted previously to be 
indicative of terrorism (or terroristic intent)—each network’s discussion appeared to 
rationalize Loughner’s actions as the product of a troubled and isolated young mind, 
disregarding any notions or insinuations of terrorism. The incident was most certainly 
tragic and horrific, but it was not an act of terrorism; and Loughner was most certainly 
not a terrorist. This position was reinforced furthe  during analysis coverage, when hosts 
and guests attempted to contextualize and understand Loughner’s apparent psychosis. 
 CNN’s Randi Kaye reported that Loughner’s internet activity in the months prior 
to the rampage displayed “disappointment and resentm t,” and he seemed to be “dealing 
with rejection and searching for a purpose.” His pots on an online gaming forum were 
difficult to comprehend and seemed to be “filled with aggression.”44 After reciting some 
of Loughner’s “hate-filled” rants, Kaye and (later) psychologist Gary Schwartz discussed 
Loughner’s fascination with “lucid dreams:” 
KAYE: Another friend, Bryce Tierney, told the online publication “Mother Jones” 
that Loughner viewed dreams as his alternative reality. Tierney said he even kept 
a dream journal. “That’s the golden piece of evidenc ,” Tierney said. “You want 
                                                        
44 Information about Loughner’s internet activity was provided to CNN by the Wall Street Journal. At the 
time of the broadcast, CNN had yet to independently confirm the posts were made by Loughner. 
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to know what goes on in Jared Loughner’s mind, there’s a dream journal that will 
tell you everything.” Strange ramblings, apparently posted on YouTube by 
Loughner, paint the picture of a young man losing his grip on reality…Is it 
possible he was dreaming when he allegedly shot Congresswoman Gabrielle 
Giffords and all those other people? 
 
SCHWARTZ: It is conceivable from what we know about his history, that he 
was…he could have been confusing when he was in a dream and when he wasn’t 
in a dream—we have to be open to that possibility. 
CNN also addressed the topic of gun control and the pot ntial consequences of 
irresponsible gun ownership.45 In an interview with 24-year-old Joe Zamudio, an armed 
man who helped subdue Loughner, hosts Kathleen Parker nd Eliot Spitzer commended 
Zamudio and asked if he was worried about firing his gun amidst the chaos, to which 
Zamudio responded bluntly, “No.” Spitzer then rephrased the question: 
Does it worry you at all—I mean, look, we don’t want to do anything to diminish 
the heroism and the wisdom of your decision—but with too many people carrying 
guns, doesn’t it increase the odds somebody might make the wrong decision and 
shoot an innocent person, even with all the good intents to actually shoot only 
somebody who was actually committing the crime? 
                                                        
45 This clip, entitled “Arizona hero, Joe Zamudio nearly shot wrong person?”, came from CNN’s official 
YouTube channel. This is important to note because that specific question was not the main focus of the 
conversation between Parker, Spitzer, and Zamudio. It s also interesting to note the lower-third graphics 
during the interview, which read: “A TRAGIC MISTAKE, AVOIDED: Zamudio nearly shot the wrong 
person.” 
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Spitzer continued to ask Zamudio for his thoughts on various gun control issues, which 
Zamudio said was, ultimately, not the real issue; rather, the issue was about helping 
(mentally ill) people before they can commit acts of vi lence. 
Just as MSNBC’s breaking news coverage had shifted focus away from Loughner 
to political rhetoric so, too, did Fox News with its coverage. Speaking with O’Reilly, who 
referred to Loughner’s mugshot as “bizarre,” Fox News political analyst Dr. Charles 
Krauthammer said “all the evidence (about Loughner) points to someone who is deeply 
and mentally disturbed,” and “not a shred of it would support the paranoid ravings of 
people who blame it on (former Republican vice presid ntial candidate) Sarah Palin, Fox 
News, the health care debate or whatever.” Krauthammer, who O’Reilly said was a 
certified psychiatrist educated at Harvard Medical School, said Loughner appeared to 
suffer from paranoid schizophrenia and might have be n hallucinating: 
I haven’t practiced in a long time, but I have been in the presence of and had 
patients who were paranoid schizophrenics and lemme tell you, it’s something 
you don’t forget. In his case, he’s got all the sign  and I think it’s simply crazy 
that we are debating the irrelevant, the political limate that supposedly caused 
these actions, when this is a guy who lived in his own self-created climate, his 
own world. 
O’Reilly and Krauthammer then discussed the ways in which the system failed to 
treat the needs of mentally ill people or prevent them from doing harm to others (due to 
bureaucratic laws). Krauthammer noted Loughner had five previous encounters with 
various law enforcement authorities but none of them could do anything until he did 
something severe. O’Reilly’s next question appeared to imply that anyone (i.e., 
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politicians, news media professionals, pundits, etc.) who would exploit the rampage for 
political gain was mentally ill, too: 
O’REILLY: Alright, let’s transfer your psychiatric nsights over to the people who 
have exploited this, uhm, for political gain. Number one: We established last 
night that this is just morally repugnant to do that; we have a 9-year-old girl dead 
and you’re trying to make political points? What is heir neurosis?  
 
KRAUTHAMMER: Well, I’m not gonna analyze (New York Times columnist) 
Krugman—he can’t afford my rates. I do only people lik  Loughner—I don’t want 
to talk about the psychology of, uh, writers who obvi usly, who are not psychotic. 
I think psychiatry has a lot to say about serious mental illness and psychosis, I 
don’t think it has a lot to say about neurosis, which s a term that’s not even used. 
Let me just approach them as people who are writing—public figures. What they 
have done is to cynically seize upon a terrible tragedy and to willfully ignore the 
evidence and use it as a political club. I think, actually, it’s not working—there’s 
a poll now that 57 percent of Americans disagree with this idea that somehow 
there’s a climate out there which compelled Loughner to act. And I think it’s very 
healthy that a majority of Americans see that. And therefore, I think they would 
see how cynical are the attempts on the left to turn his into a political event.  
 
O’REILLY: Alright, so you’d ascribe it to cynicism, nothing more? 
 
KRAUTHAMMER: Yeah—cynicism, willful ignorance and i some cases, malice.   
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O’REILLY: Okay, Charles, thanks very much, we appreciat  it. 
 The shift toward partisan political rhetoric was more pronounced during a 
conversation between host Sean Hannity and Palin. Palin called the rampage “atrocious” 
and “evil,” expressing sympathy for the families of the victims and paraphrasing Biblical 
scripture. When asked about the notion conservative rhetoric had inspired Loughner, 
Palin said she was puzzled as to why “the mainstream media would start accusing and 
using such a tragedy for, what appeared to be right off he bat, some political gain.” 
Hannity then addressed the controversial map Palin’s political action committee, 
SarahPAC, promoted during the 2010 election cycle to illustrate specific “targets” to be 
defeated. Palin, again, responded incredulously, saying the “crosshairs” featured on the 
map had been used similarly “by Democrats for years.” Furthermore, the map had 
“absolutely nothing to do with an apolitical or, perhaps even, left-leaning criminal who 
killed these innocents and injured so many.” Hannity then referred to a similar map 
issued by the Democratic Leadership Council: 
HANNITY: …all these war analogies—Clinton’s had a “war room”—it’s very 
common in politics. Why do you think you were singled out, and the left singled 
you out in this, Governor? 
 
PALIN: I know that it isn’t about me, personally, but it is about the message that I 
am not hesitant at all to spread across this country—and that is that our country 
is on the wrong track. We’ve got to get put back on the right track and we have to 
elect those officials who can adopt and enact policy to allow us to be prosperous 
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and healthy and safe again. And, uh, I know that a lot of, uh, those on the left hate 
my message and will do all that they can to stop me because they don’t like the 
message. But again, we know that it’s not just me, it’s all who seem to embrace 
the time-tested truths that, uh, helped build our country. They do not like to hear 
that message. And as many of them have promised to do, hey’ll do what they can 
to, uh, destroy the message and the messenger. 
The segment concluded with Palin saying the “republic would be destroyed,” if “they” 
succeed and stifle “the truth” or other functions of democracy.   
Although it reinforced the idea Loughner was mentally unstable, MSNBC, like 
Fox News, engaged in partisan political rhetoric, attempting to anchor the incident to 
radical right-wing hysteria and socio-political causes. Like CNN, MSNBC also attempted 
to understand the depth of Loughner’s mental instability, reporting that he had failed to 
join the military due to repeated use of marijuana d was banned from Pima Community 
College due to frequent disruptions and suspensions. According to reports, Loughner was 
banned to such an extent he was not allowed to return unless a mental health professional 
could confirm he posed no threat to the greater campus community. Speaking with host 
Lawrence O’Donnell, former classmate Steven Cates said he sympathized with 
Loughner’s sense of isolation and tried to connect with him: 
CATES: I knew what it felt like to be ostracized and isolated, and I didn’t want 
him to feel that in a poetry class, of all places.  
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O’DONNELL: And what about his poetry? Was there anythi g in his, in his 
poetry or anything in the classroom that would give you an indication about 
either his political thinkings or impulses toward violence? 
 
CATES: No, not at all. His poems were actually very much the opposite of what 
people are, have been hearing about him. One of his poems was about tending to 
a garden and the relationship a gardener has with the earth and a beautiful 
flower—that beautiful bond. Another one was called “Meathead” and it was a 
satirical poem making fun of the guys that go to the gym and spend all day at the 
gym, and their weight machine is the equivalent of their girlfriend, but nothing, 
nothing violent or political. 
 
O’DONNELL: Now, what do you make of the discussion y u’ve been hearing 
about, you know, was he influenced by comments by politicians and talking about 
targeting, uh, elected officials? Targeting them in the sense of trying to beat them 
in campaigns—would he transfer that in his brain into, “now it’s time to target 
them with a gun”? Do you think he could be influencd by any of that kind of 
thing? 
 
CATES: Uh, like I said, he lacked the stability that w s apparent with most other 
people, so I could see where there could be that, t disconnect between what is 
heard and what is meant. 
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O’Donnell asked if, perhaps, violent music had inspred Loughner to go on a 
shooting spree, to which Cates responded dismissively, saying, “That music has been 
around for quite a while and lots of people listen to that…I personally don’t see a 
connection between those.” Based on this particular exchange, it almost seemed as if 
O’Donnell’s curiosity was specious and meant to setup his final remark, which took a 
subtle jab at Palin: 
I think when people start talking about outside influences—like, maybe, some 
speech Sarah Palin gave—you have to start to include all the outside influences 
that might have affected him. 
 Maddow expanded the issue of gun control to include the topic of gun culture and 
the wanton violence it allegedly produces, opening her show with a recitation of 
casualties from similar gun violence from the last two decades—Ft. Hood included. 
Despite the apparent severity of the rampages, Maddow did not refer to any of them as 
being instances of “terrorism.” However, she made a curious connection when describing 
U.S. gun culture: 
As of 2007, the second most heavily armed society in the world—the second 
most—was the nation of Yemen. Remember? Like, Al-Qaeda nd Somalia and 
Yemen? Yemen, the second most heavily armed nation in he world. For every 100 
people in Yemen there are 61 guns. Here in the United States, for every 100 
people there are 90 guns. 
Federal Reserve Bomb Plot 
 The perpetrator’s connection to other anti-governme t groups (foreign or 
otherwise) was a critical topic of discussion during coverage of Nafis and Stack III’s 
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respective attacks. This connection appeared to be the key factor (for both federal 
authorities and news commentators) in determining whether or not each attack was, in 
fact, an act of terrorism. Speaking with host Erin Burnett the day of Nafis’ arrest, CNN 
correspondent Susan Candiotti said he came to the U.S. “with terror on his mind,” 
according to federal authorities. Furthermore, he came “to wage jihad, to destroy the 
American economy” and “possibly disrupt, or even stop, the (2012) presidential 
election.” She explained Nafis’ attempts to recruit collaborators, one of which was an 
FBI source, who recruited other undercover agents to help further the plot. The agents 
helped Nafis design a (fake) bomb “that really wouldn’t have harmed anyone” but could 
have killed “a lot of men, women, and children” if it “had been the real deal.”  
 When asked if Nafis operated as a “lone wolf,” Candiotti replied that it appeared 
to be, according to sources, although “he came here s eking help from others, other Al-
Qaeda people who could help him.” Of course, “those p ople turned out to 
be…undercover agents.” A clip of New York City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly aired, 
in which he said Nafis “was motivated by Al-Qaeda” nd the New York Police 
Department (presumably) saw “this threat” as being present “for a long time to come.” 
Candiotti concluded the segment by saying: 
It turns out right before they set off this bomb, (Nafis) wanted to stop at a hotel, 
prosecutors say, to make a suicide tape and, in fact, that’s what they did. And he 
said, on this tape, according to court papers, quote, “We will not stop until we 
attain victory or martyrdom.” Well, it appears he achieved neither one. 
 Fox News’ breaking coverage reported that Nafis tried to “attack” and “blow up” 
the Federal Reserve building, which is “just blocks away from the World Trade Center 
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site.” Host Shepard Smith said Nafis “raised some red flags after he had posted online 
some stuff about jihad, or holy war.” Smith then speculated about the way in which the 
situation occurred: 
This Middle Eastern guy starts saying stuff, uh, an informant or FBI guy gets in 
touch with him. Uh, the FBI agent then met him and—the guy, I believe, that the 
FBI agent was not an FBI agent but an accomplice—got him all this stuff 
together. Uh, the suspect and the FBI agent planned a fake attack for months, and 
this morning it went down.”46 
Smith was then joined by correspondent Rick Leventhal, who described Nafis as a 
“Bangladeshi national who…traveled to the U.S. in January for the sole purpose of 
carrying out a terrorist attack,” according to the FBI. Nafis, “in his own words,” wanted 
to “allegedly destroy America,” adding that the undercover FBI agent supplied him with 
“20 50-pound bags of, what was supposed to be, explosive material.” Leventhal, too, 
made note of Nafis’ suicide video and the fact the bomb was never designed to actually 
work. 
 Correspondent Jonathan Hunt joined the program to read a statement from acting 
FBI Assistant Director Mary Galligan, in which she said, “Attempting to destroy a 
landmark building and kill or maim untold numbers of innocent bystanders is about as 
serious as the imagination can conjure” but the “public was never at risk in this case.” 
Smith reiterated the situation, again referring to Nafis as a “Middle Eastern man” who 
came with the “sole intention of destroying America.” He said the incident sounded like 
“a major, major thing.” 
                                                        
46 Smith said, “for months,” emphatically. 
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 Claiming the entire situation sounded “very familiar,” Smith then welcomed 
Napolitano, who provided a brief explanation of how fficials perform sting operations to 
capture people who “have expressed a hatred for the United States or of American 
institutions and a willingness to attack them.” Napolitano said there were two ways to 
look at the situation: 
One is, this is a guy with very evil intention, who on his own traveled from 
Pakistan to come to the United States, expressed a hatred and antipathy to our 
institutions, and a willingness to destroy them. And if the FBI had not engaged 
him in this, he would have been free to engage on his own in some act of terror 
that would have harmed people. The other way to look at it is, this is the 
eighteenth person since 9-11 that the FBI has found and persuaded to go along 
with a plot that it created, it controlled, and tha never endangered anybody. How 
do they find people? 
He added that Americans have to determine whether or not they want the FBI to profile 
people and perform sting operations, asking, “Is it a good thing, or is it pushing the limits 
of what the law enforcement should be doing?” Smith again reiterated the incident and 
concluded, “Think of it: If the Federal Reserve Bank i  Manhattan had blown up this 
morning, where would our economy be at this moment? Of course, it was never going to 
happen. Did the FBI create this, or did the FBI help to stop this?” 
 The researcher was unable to find any breaking news clips from MSNBC. Instead, 
coverage existed from CNBC—an NBC-affiliated station that provides headlines and 
information of financial markets. As CNBC’s coverage was outside the scope of this 
research, these clips were not used as sources of applicable data. 
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 More details about Nafis’ personality and possible motivation emerged the next 
day. CNN host Zoraida Sambolin reported Nafis was in the U.S. on a student visa, 
majoring in cyber-security at Southeast Missouri State University, where he studied from 
January 2012 to May 2012. She added he was in federal custody and charged with 
“attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.” Co-host John Berman added the 
Federal Reserve was “just a few blocks east of the World Trade Center and all that 
rebuilding that is underway at Ground Zero.” Candiotti j ined the show to, again, explain 
the event, adding that Nafis used social media to connect with potential collaborators. 
According to prosecutors, said Candiotti, Nafis’ motivation was “all about jihad,” 
“destroying America,” and “wrecking the economy.”47  The previous clip from 
Commissioner Kelly aired alongside information that Nafis shifted his target from the 
New York Stock Exchange to the Federal Reserve. After Candiotti noted other statements 
attributed to Nafis, she concluded the segment with a quote from his alleged suicide 
video: 
I just want something big. Something very big…that will shake the whole 
country…and will make Muslims one-step closer to run the whole world.  
 In another segment, author and CNN national security analyst Peter Bergen 
compared Nafis’ plot to those of Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to bomb a New York 
City subway in 2009, and Faisal Shahzad, who attempt d to detonate a bomb in Times 
Square in 2010. Nafis, said Bergen, did not seem “particularly too bright,” especially for 
believing he could be connected so easily with Al-Qaeda operatives. He believed it was 
significant The New York Times did not put the story on the front page, as it wasnot of 
                                                        
47 Candiotti said, “wrecking the economy,” as she turned away from Sambolin and Berman and directly 
toward the camera.  
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“seismic importance.” Nafis was “sort of a wannabe” who wanted to be in-touch with Al-
Qaeda—and claimed to be in Bangladesh—but that was unclear.  
 Host Soledad O’Brien reiterated previous reports that Nafis had acted alone, 
which prompted contributor and TheBlaze columnist Will Cain to ask incredulously why 
“we” should be taking a lone wolf less seriously than someone who is coordinating with 
someone overseas and if it was due solely to logistics. Bergen replied there was “a natural 
ceiling to what a lone wolf can do,” citing Hasan’s rampage, which “killed 13 people,” 
and the September 11 attack, which involved “dozens and dozens of people” from all 
over the world. From a law enforcement perspective, he said, it is much “easier to break 
up something with larger numbers…because there are mo connections between people 
that you can detect,” which is why lone wolves can get through the system. Of Nafis’ 
assessment of the Federal Reserve’s influence, host Ali Velshi said it reinforced Bergen’s 
view that he “wasn’t all that bright,” as parts of his manifesto were lifted “straight from 
Wikipedia.” Velshi said not too many Americans would be able to explain the primary 
functions of the Federal Reserve because it is “not a well known landmark.” 
Fox News host Neil Cavuto opened his interview with “terror expert” Michael 
Scheuer, a former chief of the CIA’s “Bin Laden Unit” by teasing, “A suspected terrorist 
with ties to Al-Qaeda and a plan to put 9-11 to shame.” He, too, took issue with the 
mainstream media’s apparent dismissal of the story, sa ing, “Forget ‘front page news;’ 
this thing was ‘barely any news.’” Although he found the sting operation slightly 
problematic, Scheuer asserted the incident undermind the “Obama scenario…that Al-
Qaeda died with Osama,” adding that Nafis was enticd by Al-Qaeda’s mission “and the 
memory, or at least the inspiration, of Osama bin Laden.” He said The New York Times, 
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Washington Post, and “the major news channels have really hidden th  expansion of Al-
Qaeda in the years since President Obama has taken office.” 
 Fox News’ Bill Hemmer opened America’s Newsroom with quotes from Nafis’ 
manifesto, which included statements about his “mission to destroy America” for his 
“beloved Osama bin Laden.” Reiterating the details of the incident, co-host Martha 
MacCullum referred to Nafis as a “self-professed martyr” before airing an earlier clip 
from Republican Congressman Peter King. King, the House Homeland Security 
Chairman, said Nafis was “a very strong supporter of Al-Qaeda,” who claimed to know 
people in the group. Hemmer noted the proximity of the Federal Reserve to the World 
Trade Center site before being joined by Leventhal, who called Nafis a “young, wannabe 
jihadist.” Leventhal said Nafis had been under surveillance by a “room-full of law 
enforcement officers” who were watching events unfold n “big screens in their 
operation center downtown.” During his appearance in federal court, Nafis appeared 
“soft-spoken and subdued,” noting his responses “could barely” be heard. Among other 
things, Nafis was charged with “attempting to provide material support to Al-Qaeda.” If 
the bomb had been real, it could have caused significa t damage, according to officials. 
 Like Bergen and Velshi had done, Cavuto also questioned Nafis’ intelligence, 
saying people like him and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the “Christmas underwear 
bomber”) and Richard Reid (“the shoe bomber”) were not “MENSA candidates.” For 
every one of them, he said, “there is a Mohamed Atta… he mastermind of the 9-11 
attacks” planning attacks far more severe; he wondered if people like Nafis were 
“deflections.” Scheuer said it was “a good thing” the FBI performed the operation, but 
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that “it clouds the issue,” which he believed was the continued growth of Al-Qaeda (or 
otherwise anti-U.S. entities) throughout the world. He concluded: 
The Obama era, in terms of Islamic, uh, Islamist militancy has been a “your-
head-in-the-sand”-era—and America is going to pay for it very dearly. 
Cavuto ended the segment solemnly, saying, “I hope you’re wrong, Michael, but you’ve 
been spookily prescient.” 
 Extended clips from MSNBC’s analysis coverage were not immediately available 
to the researcher; again, CNBC appeared to be the lead network covering the story. 
However, in the short clips that were available, the network appeared to be more 
measured with its framing of the story. For example, host Chuck Todd described the 
attack as “an elaborate, Al-Qaeda-inspired plot,” putting emphasis on the word 
“inspired.” Todd also described Nafis as “not very bright.” In another excerpt, host 
Tamron Hall reported that Nafis’ family in Bangladesh was “stunned” by his actions, 
making MSNBC the only network to attempt to place th suspect within a greater context 
beyond “Bangladeshi national.” 
Austin Plane Crash 
 The issue of “lone wolf attacks” was also addressed during discussions of Stack 
III’s crash. CNN initially reported that the Department of Homeland Security believed 
there was neither a nexus to criminal activity nor ter orism, though this opinion changed 
over the course of its breaking news coverage. After reporting about other possible 
problems on concurrent commercial flights bound for San Francisco, Velshi asked guest 
and flight instructor John King to quantify the damge based on the type of plane, amount 
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of fuel in the tank, and other factors—all of which King dismissed as somewhat 
irrelevant: 
Well, if you’re flying an airplane, it’s going to be at a lethal speed. If you do 
decide—and we’ll assume that this is a suicide attempt—it’s a certain way to do 
it. But it’s a very unfortunate way because it puts o her people at risk. I wish he 
had chose some other method of doing this. But it’s a certain way to commit 
suicide in almost any airplane. 
Due to the lack of information at the time, Velshi and King then discussed three possible 
explanations for the crash. They began with the idea th  pilot somehow lost control of the 
plane, which King dismissed: 
KING: You might be making a maneuver and lose lift on the wings because you 
stalled the wings, but that's not what was happening here. This airplane came in 
at high speed. This was a deliberate. 
 
VELSHI: Let's look at a couple possibilities. Let's say you lose lift on a plane. A 
trained pilot would know that, if you lose lift on a plane, you actually have to 
point your nose downward to regain that lift. Is that a possibility? 
 
KING: That's correct. But let's assume that you weren't flying low to begin with. 
There's—you would have plenty of room. That's the reason for the 1,000-foot of 
minimum altitude, is to give you plenty of room to recover. 
 
VELSHI: He'd have 900 feet to fix the problem.  
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KING: Absolutely. I mean there's no reason why a person would be at that 
altitude unless they're doing some kind of deliberate misbehavior. 
 
VELSHI: Let's do problem number two: He lost power. 
 
KING: Well, normally, you would come in very slow if you lose power. You'd put 
it in a good glide speed, which is a much slower speed than your cruise speed, 
and look for a place to land—and it gives you time to land. So you would be going 
much slower if you lost power. 
 
VELSHI: And I don't know the area—what it would be lik for a pilot in Austin—
but if he's come 15 miles from an airport, he could probably swing around and 
find someplace that looks less occupied than this office park. 
 
KING: And even if you lost power, you're still under control of the airplane. 
There's no reason you would hit a seven-story building. 
 
VELSHI: Okay, number three, option number three: Something happened to him. 
He was not conscious. 
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KING: That is a possibility. It's pretty unlikely. I don't know how old this person 
was. But that's—that's a rare likelihood, but possible, that he lost consciousness 
and lost control of the airplane that way and flew into something. 
Meserve rejoined the broadcast, identifying Stack III as the pilot as saying he had set his 
house on fire earlier that morning. Although federal authorities maintained there was no 
nexus to terrorism, Meserve said they were investigatin  a possible nexus to criminal 
activity. The segment concluded with a brief conversation about the speed and impact of 
the crash with witness Mike Ernest: 
ERNEST: It was like a fireball, basically—fireball, black smoke. People, you 
know, people let out screams all around me—a few people were crying. It was—I 
mean, it was a pretty crazy scene. 
 Providing more information from the FBI and National Transportation Safety 
Board, Fox News’ Megyn Kelly said unconfirmed reports suggested the pilot “may have 
had a beef with the IRS; may have set his own house n fire; gotten into a small plane—
single-engine—and flown it into this building that housed, among other offices, the IRS.” 
After a brief conversation with witness Thadd Lindsey, who said the crash resulted in a 
“massive explosion” from “anywhere from 30 to 50-(feet) wide,” Kelly said Fox News’ 
Department of Justice Producer had confirmed Stack III as the pilot: 
KELLY: …We had heard earlier from our sources that is name was an 
American-sounding name—indeed it is. Andrew Joseph Stack. And we are looking 
for more details on him, but that is coming to us from officials. 
 MSNBC’s breaking news coverage did not identify the name of the pilot in the 
clip used for this portion of the research. However, its coverage reported the plane had 
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struck an IRS office building and firefighters were in “a defensive position,” being 
ordered to retreat from the scene due to potential danger. Its coverage also noted the crash 
was like an explosion and police had closed off portions of the road due to excessive 
black smoke billowing across the highway.  
 Analysis coverage appeared to demonstrate attempts to attribute Stack III’s 
actions to frustration and, perhaps, mental instabili y. Speaking with Velshi, anchor Rick 
Sanchez said a six-page suicide note allegedly written by Stack III “reads like a very 
angry person,” and that he “had very serious problems with the IRS:” 
SANCHEZ: He said, “There was a storm that was raging i side my head.” He 
said, “Desperate times call for desperate measures.” He says we are 
brainwashed to believe that there is freedom in this place. Remember one of these 
was no taxation without representation? He addresses that several times here—
makes reference to the Wall Street situation, something you and I have talked 
about. “Handful of thugs and plunderers can commit un hinkable atrocities and 
when it's time for their gravy train to crash under the weight of their gluttony and 
overwhelming stupidity, the force of the full federal government has no difficulty 
coming to their aid within days if not hours…” 
 
VELSHI: Wow... 
 
SANCHEZ: …Isn't that interesting? I, I knew that you'd think about that as I read 
it to you. Lemme get you through this and then we can break it up. I don't wanna 
just do a read-a-thon here for the viewers but, it's 's interesting to see what's in 
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this guy's head. “The joke we call the American medical system”—talking about 
health insurance—“the joke we call the American medical system, including the 
drug and insurance companies are murdering tens of th usands of people a year 
and stealing from the corpses of the victims they cripple and the country's leaders 
don't see this as important as bailing out a few of their vile and rich cronies.” 
What are you hearing here? 
 
AV: Yeah, he's, he's... 
 
RS: …Anti-government, anti-government, anti-governmnt, anti-Wall Street. 
 In another interview, Sanchez asked Stack III’s former co-worker, software 
engineer Michael Crawford, if he condoned the incident. Crawford had read Stack III’s 
alleged suicide note and while he did not condone his actions, said “his own hard 
experience as a software consultant (was) very much like his.” Sanchez then asked about 
Stack III’s alleged grievance with a tax reform act, “something that happened in 1986,” 
which made “a lot of folks (like Stack III) angry” about the loss of their exemption status: 
SANCHEZ: We often hear Americans complain about (the) IRS, Uncle Sam, 
taxes, “get your hand out of my pocket.” Uhm, how many people would you say 
were affected by this law that were just as angry or upset or frustrated with the 
government for doing this? 
 
CRAWFORD: Just right here in Silicon Valley, where I live, I’d have to say just a 
couple hundred thousand and, uh, several hundred thousand across the country. 
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There have been many people who have urged Congress to change the law. But, 
uh, it just sounds silly to a congressman, I’m sure, to hear a software engineer 
talking about some arcane facet of tax law that needs to be changed. But what is 
most important is that that law prevents people who ant to be self-employed and 
want to run their own businesses from determining their own destinies. 
Crawford continued to say the work of self-employed software consultants is “a very 
hard life,” subject to peculiarities and intermittent periods of inactivity. Sanchez 
responded by saying the situation sounded like “thestory of the little guy kinda feeling 
like he’s getting put upon by the big guys who are in cahoots with the government.” 
Crawford said his experience was very much like that scenario and if one were to browse 
industry message boards online, they would find software engineers “talking about it like 
that.” Sanchez closed the segment with, “It’s interesting to know what some of the 
frustrations are in this case—so deep-rooted that i would cause this man to do what he 
did on this day.” 
 On Fox News, Smith also described Stack III as having a “beef with the IRS” and 
said approximately 200 people worked in the office h attacked. He added that 
emergency crews had found a body amongst the wreckag  but would not give any 
information as to its identity. Smith then aired a series of comments from witnesses 
whose comments could be described as reminiscent of the surrealism of the September 11 
attacks: 
WITNESS A: It came, actually right over top of us, which is the only reason we 
noticed it because it was flying so low… 
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WITNESS B: It looked like he was just flying as smooth as could be… 
 
WITNESS C: That plane was going full-blast… 
 
WITNESS D: We’re thinking, “Where’s he gonna land?”… 
 
WITNESS A: It’s looping in and getting closer and closer to the apartments, but 
it, like, it’s gonna crash… 
 
WITNESS D: Next thing you hear is this really loud explosion… 
 
WITNESS A: Just from the explosion we knew the people in the plane didn’t make 
it, or however many people were in there, but it hit an office building… 
 
WITNESS E: We heard a loud sound and felt a thud and thought a big bird just 
hit our building and sure enough, you see the tail sticking out, the plane on the 
ground, the building was engulfed… 
 
WITNESS D: Everybody was pulling over on the side of the road, and there were 
people running out of the building… 
 
WITNESS E: We just thought it was a completely random occurrence, and so we 
just assumed there were people working in that building and, all of a sudden, that 
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plane lost control and crashed into that building and there was nothing anyone 
could have done about it… 
Smith reported information about the destruction of Stack III’s house and that the Red 
Cross was helping two people who had lived with him. Correspondent Nancy Zambrano 
of affiliate station KTBC joined Smith and reported the two people as possibly being 
Stack III’s wife and 12-year-old daughter. She added Stack III’s house was located in a 
quiet, “very tight-knit community” where “you’d see people jogging, people walking 
their dogs,” and “mothers with their strollers.” 
 Fox News returned to polemics during an interview with Republican 
Congressman Scott Brown of Massachusetts. Speaking with Cavuto, who referred to the 
incident as “this crazy plane crash” and Stack III as “a guy who’s just ranting at the 
system,” Brown expressed sympathy for the affected families and said he could “just 
sense, not only in my election but being here in Washington, people are frustrated.” He 
added, “I’m not sure if there’s a connection—I certainly hope not—but we need to do 
things better.” When asked if it would be extreme for people to consider the crash to be a 
result of “populist rage,” Brown lauded his campaign: 
Yeah, of course it’s extreme. You don’t know anythig about the individual; he 
could have had other issues. Certainly, no one likes paying taxes, obviously. But 
the way we’re trying to deal with things, at least have been in the past, at least 
until I got here, is there’s such a log-jam in Washington. And people want us to 
do better; they want us to solve the problems that are affecting Americans in a 
very real way. And I think—I’m hopeful—we can do that with a lot of things that 
are coming forward, at least from what I’m hearing speaking with my colleagues. 
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There seems to be a different feel, uh, there was kind of a message that was sent 
with my election—the fact that I, you know, elected by a substantial margin and 
taking the former Ted Kennedy’s seat. They want someb dy different. 
  Again, Maddow attempted to piece together the various details of the incident, 
bringing NBC News correspondent Andrea Mitchell onto the program to confirm 
“clearly” that authorities had determined the crash, w ich she referred to as “crazy” and 
“tragic,” to be a criminal act, not terrorism. Prior to Mitchell’s comments, Maddow 
discussed messages posted on social media website Facebook in which users (“people on 
the right”) expressed support for Stack III’s actions and anti-government views, including 
“a quote from Thomas Jefferson: ‘The tree of liberty must be refreshed, from time to 
time, with the blood of patriots and tyrants.’” There also were reports Stack III had left an 
explosive device in his car, but they were later dismissed. 
 Regarding the ways in which an incident like this is investigated, Mitchell said the 
FBI and CIA work together at the counterterrorism center to examine possible 
connections to other threats or “some foreign connection.” For example, she said, 
“(Federal authorities) very quickly figured out tha Major Hasan had a foreign 
connection. In this case, it was not.” She noted Stack III’s lengthy manifesto indicated 
“clearly…years and years, decades of grievances against the IRS.” Maddow appeared 
confused as to Stack III’s motivation: 
I think people instantly—which was the case with this Facebook (inaudible)—
were looking for some clear political message or clear political signal here. You 
can’t find that in the Unabomber manifesto, I don’t believe you can find that here. 
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 The segment concluded with another discussion about Stack III as a “lone wolf” 
operative, which appeared to imply that terrorism is dependent on the existence of 
“foreign connections:” 
MADDOW: In terms of this being a lone wolf action and as you say, not seeming 
to have any foreign connections, seeming to be a troubled, mentally-ill man with a 
lot of grievances—some seemingly real, some seemingly imagined.  What happens 
in law enforcement in terms of the next steps in dealing with lone wolf threats like 
this? 
 
MITCHELL: Well, had he survived there would be a clear series of events. I think 
this will be an investigation to see what led up to it, to make sure there is no 
conspiracy, that there are no other people involved. His wife, and there is a child 
involved, there had been a domestic dispute, according to neighbors and other 
authorities—so there’s a lot of sadness here and some tragic survivors. So they’ll 
have to nail all this down but if he was in fact a lone wolf, then there won’t 
obviously be any, any criminal prosecution… 
 
MADDOW: …No loose ends to tie up, yeah. 
 The possibility of defining the event as an act of terrorism was discussed 
explicitly on The Dylan Ratigan Show, which featured a segment entitled, “Terror from 
within?” The anti-government views Stack III espoused in his alleged manifesto were 
discussed immediately, with Ratigan reading a portion hat called for a revolution: 
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“I know there have been countless before me and there are sure to be many 
after…I can only hope that the numbers get too big to be white washed and 
ignored, that the American zombies wake up and revolt.” Still, the White House 
and law enforcement authorities say this does not appe r, in their view, to be 
terrorism. The Austin Fire Department, quote, “categorically denied” that fear 
this afternoon.  
 Ratigan then displayed a graphic with the definitio  of terrorism (as defined by 
the U.S. Department of Defense), which stated it as being, “The calculated use of 
unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or to 
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, 
religious, or ideological.” To discuss whether or nt it was “terror, anti-government anger 
gone too far, or something else,” Ratigan was joined by Associated Press reporter Devlin 
Barrett and Van Zandt. Ratigan said he was “no expert” but that it “certainly looks like” a 
case of domestic terrorism based on the aforementioned definition and available 
information, to which Van Zandt replied, “Well, I think if you go by the strict definition, 
it does.” The issue of labeling the crash as an act of terrorism became dependent upon 
Stack III’s status as either a lone wolf operative or member of a greater conspiracy. 
Comparing the event to the Oklahoma City attack, Van Z ndt said, “In this, everything 
that you’ve reported…suggested this is one angry, challenged, demented, frustrated, 
angry person who was mad and he just wasn’t going to take it anymore.” Crashing the 
plane into the IRS building, Van Zandt opined, was Stack III’s attempt to “make his case 
and get someone to pay attention,” adding it was a sh me he took his own life and 
(clearly) tried to take the lives of others. 
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 Addressing the issue of classification (and subsequent government action), 
Ratigan asked Barrett:  
How does the government even begin, whether it’s someb dy like this or you go to 
Ft. Hood in a different instance, when you have an individual that becomes 
angry—and Ft. Hood is different in many ways because, I know, there have been 
so many flags that have been revealed to us subsequently—but the angry self-
starter for whatever reason seems to be a very difficult thing to do with. How does 
the justice department or the government in general ven being to try to defend 
itself from that? 
Barrett, who covered the U.S. Department of Justice, reiterated the importance federal 
authorities place on the nexus to other entities, saying it was unclear at that point but “for 
all practical purposes…you could say it appears…that (Stack III) tried to do with a plane 
what Timothy McVeigh tried to do with a truck.” 
 Ratigan and Van Zandt then discussed the history of American displeasure with 
taxes, with graphics displaying a Wall Street Journal poll that claimed 83 percent of 
Americans were dissatisfied with the state of the economy, as well as a statistic from the 
Southern Poverty Law Center that said there had been 75 “domestic terrorist plots and 
rampages” since 1995. Van Zandt said the government’s main concern would be whether 
or not Stack III’s manifesto and actions represented “an on-going movement” of 
massively destructive anti-government sentiment; however, he reiterated his belief that 
the crash was an isolated incident: 
Is he is a domestic terrorist? I don’t think so—by definition, he may be; my gut 
says he’s not. My guts says, as we just discussed, that he’s a lone wolf—but that 
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lone wolf is expressing the same feelings, maybe the same howls, that many 
Americans would like to make at the same time. 
 Barrett thought Van Zandt’s assessment of the opini ns about the tax system was 
valid, saying, “If you ask anyone on the street, ‘What do you think of the IRS?’ there’s 
going to be a fair bit of negative in that, and there’s lots of people who write very angry 
things about the IRS online.” Ratigan interrupted by noting other issues Americans 
criticize and express frustration over but “luckily, for all of us, very few will get in a 
plane and fly it into a building as a result.” Barrett said the challenge for investigators is 
finding the “needle in the haystack that’s willing to act on that anger,” saying it is a very 
difficult thing to do. Ratigan ended the segment by asking Van Zandt if there existed a 
system in which officials (such as “the Israeli guy”) could determine “the difference 
between someone who’s angry and somebody who’s willing (to carry out such an 
attack),” to which he responded: 
The answer is many times we can’t. We try to measur; we try to assess threat 
based upon what the individual writes. You know, psych 101 tells us the best 
predictor of future behavior is past behavior. But you look at somebody like this, 
who had been the CEO of two software companies, he lost them; he’s been 
through a couple of bad marriages; he’s been through many financial 
challenges—hey, you know, you’re probably talking about 25 percent of America, 
right there. 
Ratigan chuckled and replied, “Exactly.” 
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CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
All four of the events examined in this thesis could be considered acts of 
terrorism, especially if considered under the parameters defined by the United States. 
Comparing the Ft. Hood and Tucson rampages, both Hasan nd Loughner had expressed 
frustration with the government and allegedly had an appreciation for anti-government or 
anti-American dissidents or groups. Further, they both targeted people and entities that 
could reasonably be seen as extensions of the greater U.S. government. Similarly, both 
Stack III and Nafis acted as lone wolf operatives who intended to strike severe blows to 
the American financial system and public, hoping their actions would either inspire 
others to take action or at least realize the problems and injustices faced by others in 
society or in other parts of the world. Although some consideration was given to the 
possibility Hasan had internalized the emotional anguish and distress of his patients and 
subsequently cracked under that pressure, no consideration was given to other factors that 
might have led Nafis to plan his attack, regardless of the validity of those factors. Further, 
despite the fact Bangladesh is located nowhere near wh t is traditionally considered as 
the Middle East, it did not stop Smith from referring to Nafis as being from that region—
twice.  
Other peculiarities of coverage included: the continued rhetorical hostility 
expressed by both MSNBC and Fox News anchors, who engaged, at various points, in 
the promotion of certain political ideologies—especially during coverage of the Tucson 
rampage. The use of hyperbole and polemics was also apparent. For example, the way in 
which Fox News’ Peters referred to the Ft. Hood ramp ge as the worst case of terrorism 
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since the September 11 attacks, despite it being nowhere near the scale or scope of that 
incident. It would have been interesting to see whether or not Peters classified Stack III’s 
attack in a similar manner, as it was at the very last the same method of attack. Also of 
note was the way in which Van Zandt seemingly dismis ed Stack III’s motivation as 
merely an extreme manifestation of the rampant socio-e onomic and political unrest 
going on at the time; in this instance, Stack III was the exception, not the rule. This sort 
of consideration was not observed during coverage of Nafis’ plot, despite the fact a 
number of Muslims (both in and outside the U.S.) feel belittled and isolated by various 
American domestic and foreign policies. These Muslim , like the overwhelming majority 
of Americans, do not pursue violence as a legitimate means to change these policies but 
rather, persevere and attempt to engage their communities in positive ways to bring 
attention to various issues. 
 These four incidents were selected and analyzed du to the apparent similarities 
that existed between them. Still, at the heart of this research is the question, “What if…?” 
This question would appear to be bolstered by Van Zdt’s “it is but it isn’t”-approach to 
the concept of terrorism during coverage of the Austin plane crash. What if Loughner or 
Stack III had been Muslim—instead of non-denominational (or otherwise non-religious), 
outwardly generic white men? Would Van Zandt, for example, have been as quick to 
dismiss the “strict definition” of terrorism? Similar y, what if Hasan or Nafis had not 
been Muslims or not attributed their actions to what they believed to be precepts of 
Islamic doctrine? What if Hasan had never said “Allahu akbar” before he started shooting 
his fellow soldiers? What if Stack III had been a member of some organized anti-
government group or in contact with known political dissidents and not a lone wolf? 
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What if his plane had caused more casualties and damage, or merely had the potential to 
have done more?  
 How might news media have contextualized these incide ts had these and other 
circumstances been different? Obviously, none of these questions can ever be answered, 
nor could any sane person ever possibly hope for similar situations to occur in which 
these questions could be answered. In addition, no sane person could look at these 
extraordinary instances of violence, given their respective circumstances, and not 
condemn them as anomalously horrific. However, consider the following four scenarios: 
 On July 22, 2011, 32-year-old Anders Behring Breivik disguised himself as a 
police officer and bombed government buildings in Oslo, Norway. A short time later, he 
gunned down numerous attendees of a Norwegian Labour Party summer youth camp, 
killing 76 and injuring 151 total people in both attacks (BBC, 2011). In an online 
manifesto that included “an extreme, bizarre and rambling screed of Islamophobia, far-
right Zionism and venomous attacks on Marxism and multi-culturalism” (Hartman, 
2011), Breivik lamented the loss of European identity and nationalism due to growing 
populations of Muslims in Western Europe.48 He added, “once you decide to strike, it is 
better to kill too many than not enough, or you risk reducing the desired ideological 
impact of the strike. Explain what you have done (in an announcement distributed prior 
to operation) and make certain that everyone understand  that we, the free peoples of 
Europe, are going to strike again and again.” After his arrest, a psychiatric evaluation 
                                                        
48 Interestingly enough, Breivik noted he didn’t hate Muslims in any way and he “had several Muslim 
friends over the years, some of which I still respect” (Hartman, 2011). 
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diagnosed Breivik as a paranoid schizophrenic suffering from psychosis—a judgment to 
which he took great offense, believing it undermined the righteousness of his mission.49 
 On May 1, 2012, federal authorities arrested five white men and charged them 
with plotting to blow up a bridge in the suburbs of Cleveland, Ohio. Described by 
authorities as anarchists who were once associated wi h the Cleveland branch of the anti-
corporate “Occupy” movement, the men planted what tey believed to be real C-4 
explosives at the base of the bridge. According to U.S. Attorney Steven Dettelbach, the 
men “talked about making a statement against corporate America and the government as 
some of the motivations for their actions” (Sheeran & Franko, 2012). 
 On July 20, 2012, James Eagan Holmes opened fire on patrons at the midnight 
premiere of the film The Dark Knight Rises at a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, 
killing 12 and injuring 58 total people—the largest mass shooting in U.S. history 
(Sandell, Dolak, & Curry, 2012). Dressed in tactical assault gear, Holmes opened fire on 
the moviegoers after throwing two smoke canisters into the theater. Upon his arrest, 
which occurred without any significant incident, Holmes informed police he had booby-
trapped his apartment prior to his rampage. According to some people who knew him, 
Holmes “seemed like a nice guy” and was studious and “very bright” (Burnett & Fender, 
2012). 
 Finally, on August 5, 2012, Wade Michael Page killed six people after opening 
fire at a Sikh gurdwara located in Oak Creek, Wiscon in. Page, who killed himself at the 
end of the rampage, allegedly had ties to various white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups, 
and was involved with several neo-Nazi bands. According to an ex-friend, Page was 
                                                        
49 After repeated psychiatric evaluations, prosecutors declared Breivik to be insane, stating in reports that 
he lived in his “own delusional universe where all his thoughts and acts are guided by his delusions” (BBC, 
2011). 
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“always the loner type” and spoke about an impending “racial holy war” in the years 
prior to the rampage (CNN Wire Staff, 2012b). U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said 
the rampage was “an act of terrorism, an act of hatred, a hate crime” (CNN Wire Staff, 
2012c), whereas Oak Creek Police Chief John Edwards said Page’s motives “died with 
him” though he did not believe the incident was “a well-thought out planned type thing” 
(Quijano, 2012). 
 Although none of these incidents were examined for the purpose of this research, 
they serve as other potential examples of the socio-cultural and socio-political dissonance 
contemporary American society experiences when confronted by the concept of terrorism 
or when terrorism-like events occur. Given perceptions and portrayals of Arabs and Islam 
in the post-September 11 era, how might these tragic events been discussed and 
contextualized by broadcast news media (cable or otherwise) had the names of the 
perpetrators instead been Muhammad, Ali, Omar, or Abdullah? How might news 
commentators, pundits, and law enforcement authorities discuss their opinions about each 
case on national television had the motivations of the perpetrators been associated, 
however tenuously, with various precepts of Islamic doctrine or culture? Imagine a 
scenario in which a perpetrator’s motivation was not the result of some perceived 
religious edict to “kill the infidels” but rather, was due to having had a terrible day and an 
abundance of stress. How might mainstream broadcast news media cover and 
contextualize such an event?  
As the findings of this research appear to indicate, tel vision news media would 
likely contextualize the incident within frameworks of terrorism—or at the very least, 
within a framework of either societal or “anti-American” otherness—simply due to the 
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pre-established socio-cultural and socio-political n rratives that automatically equate 
Islam, Muslims, and the Muslim world with anti-American sentiment and violent 
behavior. Even if later news reports clarified the incident as an isolated act of aggression, 
the norms and routines of mainstream news media production during breaking news 
coverage and the modern historicity of the relationship between the U.S. and the Muslim 
world would have likely primed the public to internalize the incident as another example 
of Islam’s alleged antipathy toward “the West.”  
For example, if Loughner or Stack III were members of the Arab or Muslim 
communities, as Hasan and Nafis were identified to be, would news media (and 
subsequently, the public) have examined their actions through a different lens—one that 
was not colored, perhaps naturally, by Judeo-Christian norms and historicity? To 
elaborate, in an interview with The Hill, CAIR executive director Nihad Awad expressed 
confusion as to why organizations were slow to categorize Stack III’s attack as an act of 
terrorism, saying, “Terrorism is terrorism, regardless of the faith, race or ethnicity of the 
perpetrator or the victims.” He added, “If a Muslim had carried out the IRS attack, it 
would have surely been labeled an act of terrorism” (Yager, 2010). Contrarily, 
international relations and terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University 
defined Stack III’s very public suicide as a “cathar ic outburst of violence”—not 
terrorism—saying his attack did not appear to be politically motivated (Madigan, 2010). 
This is in spite of Stack III’s alleged suicide note, which expressed anger toward the IRS 
and various aspects of the global financial crisis of 2008 (Plohetski, 2010).50 Regardless 
of his motivations, Stack III still committed an incredibly dramatic suicide, one that had 
profound effects on the people who were unfortunate enough to be in his line of fire.  
                                                        
50 See Appendix A for Stack III’s alleged suicide note/manifesto. 
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Writing about the Tucson shooting as a guest columnist for CNN in 2010, 
comedian Dean Obeidallah remarked: 
What if a Muslim-American had made anti-government sta ements and shot a 
U.S. congresswoman at a political event? Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
earlier this week called the suspect Jared Loughner an "extremist"—but not a 
terrorist. Would Clinton and others be so hesitant to apply the terrorist label to 
an American Muslim or Arab-American? By the way, what is Loughner's 
religion? It's not part of the news coverage, but we certainly know he isn't 
Muslim. If he were, the media, elected officials and law enforcement would be 
discussing that issue extensively. When a terrible crime in America is committed 
by a non-Muslim, the suspect's religion is simply not relevant.  
This apparent disparity in contextualization even extends itself, as Yin explained, 
to the courtroom. During a court appearance in April 2012, Breivik said of the 
aforementioned psychiatric evaluation: “These are not just misunderstandings—they are 
evil, fictional inventions to support their assumptions…I think that you couldn’t 
comprehend that a normal person could do something like that. You think that a person 
who does something like that…must be sick.” While Breivik’s mental state before, 
during, or even after he performed the massacre is debatable, perhaps his most salient 
point of contention with the report was his claim that had he been “a bearded jihadist, 
there wouldn’t have been any psychiatrists whatsoever” (Gibbs, 2012). Although the 
tirade of a murderer would be the last place in which to find evidence for this research, 
Breivik’s assumption does underscore the idea that in the absence of factors related to or 
associated with Islam or the Muslim world, mass-scale violence has been established on 
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some social or cultural level to be the product of extreme mental illness and not an 
instance of terrorism. Again, as Anselmi (2000) and DeFoster (2010) claimed, such 
internal reasons are not ascribed to non-whites (or perhaps, non-minorities) when they 
commit similar crimes.  
Some might argue disparities in coverage are due primarily to the presence or lack 
of political affiliation or motivation associated with the perpetrator. This argument, 
however, seems to be more of a connotative understanding based on contemporary views 
and portrayals of the concept of terrorism and is nearly an example of the fallacy of the 
single cause, since it assumes no other motivation other than Islamic doctrine as the 
reason why a person might feel compelled to commit such a heinous attack on innocent 
people.51 Further, it fails to consider the method of attack or the scope of the damage; the 
severity of either cannot be ignored or discarded textually. It, too, underscores the idea 
that terrorism and terrorism-like behavior are understood socially, culturally, and 
politically to be fundamental tropes of Islamic doctrine or Muslim culture. This is in spite 
of the numerous condemnations from Muslim leaders and scholars—in both the Western 
and Muslim world—that disavow terrorism and indiscrminate, unjustified violence or 
aggression as legitimate expressions of Islamic beliefs, principles, or even rules of 
engagement or war. While it cannot be ignored that, certainly, there exist Muslims who 
find in various verses of Qur’an,52 the holy text of Islam, justifications for wanton 
violence against non-Muslims, such individuals would appear to be as guilty as anti-
                                                        
51 Some polemicists use similar arguments to “prove” th  inherently violent nature of Islam, citing civil 
unrest throughout the Middle East as proof of Islam’s incompatibility with peace or notions of 
“modernity.” Such arguments, however, fail to consider other possible factors contributing to discord in the 
region such as secular cultural practices or social norms, government corruption, the consequences of 
foreign policies or diplomatic sanctions, or simple failures inherent within human nature. Thus, such 
arguments are invalid. 
 
52 Qur’an is often transliterated as “Koran.” 
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Muslim polemicists of deliberately ignoring the great r literary or historical contexts in 
which those verses are believed to have been revealed. Thus, it could be said that many of 
these individuals commit terrorism in spite of Islam, not because of it; it is no different 
than radical anti-abortion activists who act violent y against abortion clinics or doctors 
“in the name of Christianity.” 
Consider other instances of massive social unrest that occurred during the post-
September 11 era: the England riot in August 2011; the Vancouver riot in June 2011; the 
Los Angeles riot in June 2009; or the University of Minnesota riot in April 2003. With 
the exception of the first example, which occurred as a result of increasing racial tension, 
the others occurred in reaction to the outcome of achampionship sports game. Despite 
the deaths, injuries, and excessive property damage, there did not seem to be any sort of 
implication that these rioters were representative of some aspect of their various cultural, 
religious, or social identities—they were simply rioters. In discussions about Islam, 
Muslim behavior, terrorism-like events, or the continued unrest in the Middle East, 
analysis and opinion appears to be given not only vis-à-vis “otherness” and September 
11, but also vis-à-vis Judeo-Christian belief, contextualization, and historicity—largely 
ignoring the effects of years of imperialistic foreign policies or the lingering influence of 
colonialism on inter- and intra- socio-political dynamics and religio-cultural identities 
within the region. This in no way excuses or condones the behaviors or reactions of 
Muslims in these areas to certain stimuli seen as antagonistic to their beliefs or cultural 
norms (e.g., anti-Islamic opinions or works of art nd literature), but their reactions 
cannot be explained simply as being part and parcel of their “inherently violent” religious 
beliefs or apparent socio-cultural backwardness. 
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Although the public might assume or expect journalists to work under the strictest 
conditions of objectivity, the reality is they are still human beings and subject to instances 
of poor judgment, error, and self-interest the same s any other person, interest group, or 
organization/corporation. This natural by-product of news production is complicated 
further by a mainstream media system, hegemonic stru ture, and political economy that 
appears slow to address or adequately explain complex narratives of socio-political, 
socio-cultural, and religious significance—especially when those narratives involve 
minority groups. However, this does not excuse the tendency of major broadcast news 
media organizations to speculate the details about news stories due to relentless pressure 
to “scoop” other networks, provide exclusive information, or generate ratings—to 
essentially forego the basic ethical frameworks taught to undergraduate journalism 
students. In a post-fact society, good journalism cannot be sacrificed for the sake of 
increasing ad revenue or a quarterly pop in viewership; there is no shame in waiting for 
more information to become available if the result is a more accurate story. 
Academia might also benefit from additional study of media portrayals of 
Muslims and the Muslim-American identity, at least a the undergraduate level. 
Substantial attention is paid to discussing media coverage of other minority groups and 
philosophies and although such discussions are no less important, communications and 
journalism students might especially benefit from increased emphasis on coursework that 
examines media messages about Arabs, Islam, and Muslims. Given the current socio-
political climate, such emphasis might aid the next generation of media professionals 
when they cover those topics and the complexities that sometimes surround them. 
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Still, caution must be exercised when discussing the influence or pervasiveness of 
media messages on perceptions of Islam, Muslims, and Muslim-Americans, lest such 
discussions commit the aforementioned fallacy. Certainly, whatever shortcomings 
mainstream American media might have, public perceptions and media messages/images 
of Muslim-Americans will not change until Muslim-Americans become more active 
socio-cultural participants in American society. Muslim-Americans, young and old, must 
continue to be active participants in the public discourse about their identities if they wish 
to curtail or eliminate the stereotypical or otherwise negative perceptions and media 
images of them presented over the last decade. In addition, they must continue to 
contemplate, discover, and examine the ways in which their identities either coincide or 
conflict with certain American cultural norms, and they must embrace and become 
courageous enough to speak to others about the validity of their identities as both 
Muslims and Americans. This must occur and be initiated at all levels of social 
engagement and awareness.  
At the individual level, Muslims must learn to embrace their identities as 
American citizens and not be “immigrant” citizens—fully cognizant of all the rights, 
privileges, and responsibilities inherent to the former.53 This means they must begin to 
move away from certain “old country” socio-cultural norms and attitudes seen as rude, 
inconsiderate, or out of place in American society. However, this does not at all mean 
they should completely discard their identities as immigrants, or embrace subjective 
standards of “modernity” incongruent to key tenets of their faith. Rather, it means it is 
                                                        
53 In this case, “immigrant” could be defined as the fe ling that no matter how many years a person might 
live outside his or her native country, a person might always consider him or herself as being, 
fundamentally, an outsider. 
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imperative they accept and understand the positive rol  Islam and Muslims can and 
should have in American society, discarding antiquated notions that either is 
fundamentally antithetical to certain aspects of that society. 
At the social level, Muslim-American communities must encourage and facilitate 
scholarship and social engagement beyond the realms of engineering, medicine, and law. 
Although it is important for Muslim-Americans to continue to pursue and excel in those 
fields, it is also crucial that communities promote career paths in the arts, hard sciences, 
and humanities—three fields that enabled the Muslim world to flourish in a time when 
the rest of the known world was experiencing a severe drought in academic and social 
achievement. Dominance, achievement, and excellence are critical elements of American 
history, the American narrative, and media culture—from sports team dynasties to 
scientific breakthroughs and technological advancements—thus, it is vital that the utility 
of Muslim-American achievement extends beyond the immediate needs of the 
community and into the mainstream. American culture and media values “bootstrap”-like 
narratives and characters—the stories and people that exemplify the work ethic, strength 
of will, and commitment to the common good that underscore the concept of the 
“American Dream.”  
The necessity for Muslim-Americans to contribute to causes beyond their own 
communities assumes a greater importance at the organizational level. Indeed, some 
Muslim-Americans believe much of the anti-Muslim rhetoric expressed in the aftermath 
of the September 11 attacks was the result of years of self-imposed insulation from the 
greater American consciousness and media. For many years, Muslim-Americans (and 
some individuals from Arab and Southeast Asian descent) were content to live below the 
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public radar, going about their everyday business and generally avoiding discourse or 
activity that would bring attention to their religion or cultural heritage, especially if such 
engagement had anything to do with the politics of the region. Given the stereotypes 
some Americans might have believed due to years of ill-informed or otherwise poorly 
constructed media messages about the Middle East and Muslims (i.e., the aforementioned 
images based largely on concepts of Orientalism), it would seem reasonable for Muslim-
Americans to have reservations about displaying aspect  of their faith or ethnicities. In 
the aftermath of September 11, the by-product of such disengagement was a society that 
believed Muslim-Americans were attempting to usurp the laws, freedoms, and socio-
cultural norms of America, replacing them with the standards of a supposedly antiquated 
theocracy in which “infidels” receive severe punishments for their various indiscretions. 
Although the active, continuous work of numerous mosques and Muslim-
American and civil rights organizations has done much to correct misconceptions about 
Islam and combat anti-Muslim rhetoric and media messages, this culture of isolation is, 
to a degree, still apparent within the greater community. This is why it is also important 
for Muslim-American communities to address issues byond those related specifically to 
Muslims and be proactive in showing support of their f llow citizens. Sometimes, 
Muslim-American organizations will only address tragedies and issues that pertain to the 
community itself, ignoring or finding it outside the scope of the organization’s essential 
focus to tackle other matters. This rigidity only helps to reinforce ideas that the Muslim-
American community (or at the very least, its community leaders) views itself as being, 
in some way, outside the frameworks of contemporary American society. It also helps to 
reinforce ideas in the minds of pundits (anti-Muslim or otherwise) and politicians that the 
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community’s silence is somehow tacit approval of violent activities or widespread 
indifference toward events unrelated to the community at-large. 
 Therefore, it is vitally important for leadership and civil rights organizations 
within the greater Muslim-American community to not only reach out to other civil or 
minority organizations but to also express support for the efforts of those communities, 
especially during times of tragedy. This support must come in the form of practical, 
straightforward public relations campaigns and media initiatives that emphasize solidarity 
with the victims and reaffirm the community’s commit ent to American standards of 
justice. While the Muslim-American community should in no way seek to abandon the 
beliefs or norms established by Islam, it should not disregard the importance of being 
active participants in the public dialogue about matters beyond Middle East foreign 
policy and racial/community profiling.  
However, there still exists a great need for Muslim-A ericans to inject 
themselves into stories about their communities. Individuals outside the greater Muslim 
(and Muslim-American) community tell much of the narrative about Islam and Muslims. 
Obviously, this is problematic because it allows others to dictate the contextualization of 
the Muslim identity and define various tenets of Islamic doctrine in the minds of news 
media professionals and the public. This might be the reason why certain words like 
“jihad,” for example, are still misunderstood by some to mean “holy war.”54 Therefore, it 
is critical that Muslims actively engage media outlets and volunteer to serve as sources 
for stories about Islam or the community. By organizing and executing a number of 
                                                        
54 “Jihad” literally means “to struggle/strive for” in Arabic. Although armed resistance is considered jihad, 
it is not the primary definition of the term, at least not as it is used by news media. Speaking against 
oppression; improving one’s practice; being patient n the face of adversity; and acquiring knowledge also 
qualify as jihad. 
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concerted media initiatives that establish firmly the place of Muslim-Americans in the 
greater public conscious, both media organizations and the public will be better equipped 
to understand the broad scope of issues faced by the community. 
Future Research 
 Future research of this subject would benefit from an examination of additional 
clips or all-day coverage from the various networks to observe other ways in which 
broadcast news media contextualize violence done by other minority groups. This could 
be extended to coverage of violence that happens in other countries, particularly in 
Europe and North Africa (especially in the aftermath of the revolutions that occurred 
throughout 2011). Research might also benefit from an examination of the ways in which 
network television stations covered these (and similar) ncidents; in fact, this coverage 
might be more pertinent because such coverage has the potential to be seen by a wider 
segment of the population, as over-the-air networks like NBC, CBS, ABC, and Fox are 
standard channels received by every television owner. An examination of coverage by 
well-known international networks like the BBC might also prove beneficial. 
 Given the cultural, ethnic, socio-economic, and political diversity present in the 
Muslim-American community, a twist on this research would be to present these or 
similar clips to Muslims to glean their opinions. Further, to compare and contrast those 
opinions with those of other minority (or otherwise non-Muslim) groups. Similar to the 
aforementioned Washington Post study, these clips could be shown sans any identifiable 
information about the networks or the perpetrators or altered to present the perpetrators as 
being from different ethnic, socio-economic, or political groups. 
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APPENDIX A 
Andrew Joseph Stack III’s Suicide Note 
 
 The following is the alleged suicide note of Andrew Joseph Stack III. This note 
was written and published online to a site domain registered to addresses linked to Stack 
III prior to the plane crash:55 
 
If you’re reading this, you’re no doubt asking yourself, “Why did this have to happen?” 
The simple truth is that it is complicated and has been coming for a long time. The 
writing process, started many months ago, was intended to be therapy in the face of the 
looming realization that there isn’t enough therapy in the world that can fix what is 
really broken. Needless to say, this rant could fil vo umes with example after example if I 
would let it. I find the process of writing it frustrating, tedious, and probably pointless… 
especially given my gross inability to gracefully articulate my thoughts in light of the 
storm raging in my head. Exactly what is therapeutic about that I’m not sure, but 
desperate times call for desperate measures. 
We are all taught as children that without laws there would be no society, only anarchy. 
Sadly, starting at early ages we in this country have been brainwashed to believe that, in 
return for our dedication and service, our governmet stands for justice for all. We are 
further brainwashed to believe that there is freedom in this place, and that we should be 
ready to lay our lives down for the noble principals represented by its founding fathers. 
Remember? One of these was “no taxation without representation”. I have spent the total 
years of my adulthood unlearning that crap from only a few years of my childhood. These 
days anyone who really stands up for that principal is promptly labeled a “crackpot”, 
traitor and worse. 
While very few working people would say they haven’t had their fair share of taxes (as 
can I), in my lifetime I can say with a great degree of certainty that there has never been 
a politician cast a vote on any matter with the likes of me or my interests in mind. Nor, 
for that matter, are they the least bit interested in me or anything I have to say. 
Why is it that a handful of thugs and plunderers can ommit unthinkable atrocities (and 
in the case of the GM executives, for scores of years) and when it’s time for their gravy 
train to crash under the weight of their gluttony and overwhelming stupidity, the force of 
the full federal government has no difficulty coming to their aid within days if not hours? 
Yet at the same time, the joke we call the American medical system, including the drug 
and insurance companies, are murdering tens of thousands of people a year and stealing 
from the corpses and victims they cripple, and thiscountry’s leaders don’t see this as 
important as bailing out a few of their vile, rich cronies. Yet, the political 
“representatives” (thieves, liars, and self-serving scumbags is far more accurate) have 
endless time to sit around for year after year and debate the state of the “terrible health 
                                                        
55 Editors. (2010). Internet note posted by man linked to plane crash. Austin-American Statesman.  
February 18, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.statesman.com/blogs/content/shared-
gen/blogs/austin/blotter/entries/2010/02/18/internet_ ote_posted_by_man_li.html/?cxntcid=breaki
ng_news 
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care problem”. It’s clear they see no crisis as long as the dead people don’t get in the 
way of their corporate profits rolling in. 
And justice? You’ve got to be kidding! 
How can any rational individual explain that white elephant conundrum in the middle of 
our tax system and, indeed, our entire legal system? Here we have a system that is, by 
far, too complicated for the brightest of the master scholars to understand. Yet, it 
mercilessly “holds accountable” its victims, claiming that they’re responsible for fully 
complying with laws not even the experts understand. The law “requires” a signature on 
the bottom of a tax filing; yet no one can say truthf lly that they understand what they are 
signing; if that’s not “duress” than what is. If this is not the measure of a totalitarian 
regime, nothing is. 
How did I get here? 
My introduction to the real American nightmare starts back in the early ‘80s. 
Unfortunately after more than 16 years of school, smewhere along the line I picked up 
the absurd, pompous notion that I could read and unerstand plain English. Some friends 
introduced me to a group of people who were having ‘tax code’ readings and 
discussions. In particular, zeroed in on a section relating to the wonderful “exemptions” 
that make institutions like the vulgar, corrupt Catholic Church so incredibly wealthy. We 
carefully studied the law (with the help of some of the “best”, high-paid, experienced tax 
lawyers in the business), and then began to do exactly what the “big boys” were doing 
(except that we weren’t steeling from our congregation or lying to the government about 
our massive profits in the name of God). We took a great deal of care to make it all 
visible, following all of the rules, exactly the way the law said it was to be done. 
The intent of this exercise and our efforts was to bring about a much-needed re-
evaluation of the laws that allow the monsters of organized religion to make such a 
mockery of people who earn an honest living. However, this is where I learned that there 
are two “interpretations” for every law; one for the very rich, and one for the rest of us… 
Oh, and the monsters are the very ones making and enforcing the laws; the inquisition is 
still alive and well today in this country. 
That little lesson in patriotism cost me $40,000+, 10 years of my life, and set my 
retirement plans back to 0. It made me realize for the first time that I live in a country 
with an ideology that is based on a total and complete lie. It also made me realize, not 
only how naive I had been, but also the incredible stupidity of the American public; that 
they buy, hook, line, and sinker, the crap about their “freedom”… and that they continue 
to do so with eyes closed in the face of overwhelming evidence and all that keeps 
happening in front of them. 
Before even having to make a shaky recovery from the sting of the first lesson on what 
justice really means in this country (around 1984 after making my way through 
engineering school and still another five years of “paying my dues”), I felt I finally had 
to take a chance of launching my dream of becoming an independent engineer. 
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On the subjects of engineers and dreams of independence, I should digress somewhat to 
say that I’m sure that I inherited the fascination for creative problem solving from my 
father. I realized this at a very young age. 
The significance of independence, however, came much later during my early years of 
college; at the age of 18 or 19 when I was living o my own as student in an apartment in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. My neighbor was an elderly retired woman (80+ seemed 
ancient to me at that age) who was the widowed wifeof a retired steel worker. Her 
husband had worked all his life in the steel mills of central Pennsylvania with promises 
from big business and the union that, for his 30 years of service, he would have a pension 
and medical care to look forward to in his retirement. Instead he was one of the 
thousands who got nothing because the incompetent mill management and corrupt union 
(not to mention the government) raided their pensio funds and stole their retirement. All 
she had was social security to live on. 
In retrospect, the situation was laughable because her  I was living on peanut butter and 
bread (or Ritz crackers when I could afford to splurge) for months at a time. When I got 
to know this poor figure and heard her story I felt worse for her plight than for my own 
(I, after all, I thought I had everything to in front of me). I was genuinely appalled at one 
point, as we exchanged stories and commiserated with each other over our situations, 
when she in her grandmotherly fashion tried to convince me that I would be “healthier” 
eating cat food (like her) rather than trying to get all my substance from peanut butter 
and bread. I couldn’t quite go there, but the impression was made. I decided that I didn’t 
trust big business to take care of me, and that I would take responsibility for my own 
future and myself. 
Return to the early ‘80s, and here I was off to a terrifying start as a ‘wet-behind-the-ears’ 
contract software engineer… and two years later, thanks to the fine backroom, midnight 
effort by the sleazy executives of Arthur Andersen (the very same folks who later brought 
us Enron and other such calamities) and an equally sleazy New York Senator (Patrick 
Moynihan), we saw the passage of 1986 tax reform act with its section 1706. 
For you who are unfamiliar, here is the core text of he IRS Section 1706, defining the 
treatment of workers (such as contract engineers) for tax purposes.  
Visit this link for a conference committee report 
(http://www.synergistech.com/1706.shtml#ConferenceCommitteeReport) regarding the 
intended interpretation of Section 1706 and the relvant parts of Section 530, as 
amended. For information on how these laws affect technical services workers and their 
clients, read our discussion here (http://www.synergistech.com/ic-taxlaw.shtml). 
SEC. 1706. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. 
(a) IN GENERAL - Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 is amended by adding at the 
end thereof the following new subsection: 
(d) EXCEPTION. - This section shall not apply in the case of an individual who pursuant 
to an arrangement between the taxpayer and another person, provides services for such 
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other person as an engineer, designer, drafter, computer programmer, systems analyst, 
or other similarly skilled worker engaged in a similar line of work. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE. - The amendment made by this section shall apply to 
remuneration paid and services rendered after December 31, 1986. 
Note: 
· “another person” is the client in the traditional job-shop relationship. 
· “taxpayer” is the recruiter, broker, agency, or job shop. 
· “individual”, “employee”, or “worker” is you. 
Admittedly, you need to read the treatment to understand what it is saying but it’s not 
very complicated. The bottom line is that they may as well have put my name right in the 
text of section (d). Moreover, they could only have be n more blunt if they would have 
came out and directly declared me a criminal and non-citizen slave. Twenty years later, I 
still can’t believe my eyes. 
During 1987, I spent close to $5000 of my ‘pocket change’, and at least 1000 hours of my 
time writing, printing, and mailing to any senator, congressman, governor, or slug that 
might listen; none did, and they universally treated me as if I was wasting their time. I 
spent countless hours on the L.A. freeways driving to meetings and any and all of the 
disorganized professional groups who were attempting to mount a campaign against this 
atrocity. This, only to discover that our efforts were being easily derailed by a few moles 
from the brokers who were just beginning to enjoy the windfall from the new declaration 
of their “freedom”. Oh, and don’t forget, for all of the time I was spending on this, I was 
loosing income that I couldn’t bill clients. 
After months of struggling it had clearly gotten to be a futile exercise. The best we could 
get for all of our trouble is a pronouncement from an IRS mouthpiece that they weren’t 
going to enforce that provision (read harass engineers and scientists). This immediately 
proved to be a lie, and the mere existence of the regulation began to have its impact on 
my bottom line; this, of course, was the intended effect. 
Again, rewind my retirement plans back to 0 and shift t em into idle. If I had any sense, I 
clearly should have left abandoned engineering and never looked back. 
Instead I got busy working 100-hour workweeks. Then came the L.A. depression of the 
early 1990s. Our leaders decided that they didn’t need the all of those extra Air Force 
bases they had in Southern California, so they were closed; just like that. The result was 
economic devastation in the region that rivaled the widely publicized Texas S&L fiasco. 
However, because the government caused it, no one gav  a shit about all of the young 
families who lost their homes or street after street of boarded up houses abandoned to the 
wealthy loan companies who received government funds to “shore up” their windfall. 
Again, I lost my retirement. 
 124
Years later, after weathering a divorce and the consta t struggle trying to build some 
momentum with my business, I find myself once again beginning to finally pick up some 
speed. Then came the .COM bust and the 911 nightmare. Our leaders decided that all 
aircraft were grounded for what seemed like an eterni y; and long after that, ‘special’ 
facilities like San Francisco were on security alert for months. This made access to my 
customers prohibitively expensive. Ironically, after what they had done the Government 
came to the aid of the airlines with billions of our tax dollars … as usual they left me to 
rot and die while they bailed out their rich, incompetent cronies WITH MY MONEY! 
After these events, there went my business but not quite yet all of my retirement and 
savings. 
By this time, I’m thinking that it might be good for a change. Bye to California, I’ll try 
Austin for a while. So I moved, only to find out that this is a place with a highly inflated 
sense of self-importance and where damn little realengineering work is done. I’ve never 
experienced such a hard time finding work. The rates are 1/3 of what I was earning 
before the crash, because pay rates here are fixed by the three or four large companies in 
the area who are in collusion to drive down prices and wages… and this happens 
because the justice department is all on the take and doesn’t give a fuck about serving 
anyone or anything but themselves and their rich buddies. 
To survive, I was forced to cannibalize my savings and retirement, the last of which was a 
small IRA. This came in a year with mammoth expenses and not a single dollar of 
income. I filed no return that year thinking that because I didn’t have any income there 
was no need. The sleazy government decided that they disagreed. But they didn’t notify 
me in time for me to launch a legal objection so when I attempted to get a protest filed 
with the court I was told I was no longer entitled to due process because the time to file 
ran out. Bend over for another $10,000 helping of justice. 
So now we come to the present. After my experience with the CPA world, following the 
business crash I swore that I’d never enter another accountant’s office again. But here I 
am with a new marriage and a boatload of undocumented income, not to mention an 
expensive new business asset, a piano, which I had no idea how to handle. After 
considerable thought I decided that it would be irresponsible NOT to get professional 
help; a very big mistake. 
When we received the forms back I was very optimistic that they were in order. I had 
taken all of the years information to XXXX XXXX, and he came back with results very 
similar to what I was expecting. Except that he hadneglected to include the contents of 
Sheryl’s unreported income; $12,700 worth of it. To make matters worse, XXXX knew all 
along this was missing and I didn’t have a clue until he pointed it out in the middle of the 
audit. By that time it had become brutally evident that he was representing himself and 
not me. 
This left me stuck in the middle of this disaster trying to defend transactions that have no 
relationship to anything tax-related (at least the tax-related transactions were poorly 
documented). Things I never knew anything about and thi gs my wife had no clue would 
ever matter to anyone. The end result is… well, just look around. 
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I remember reading about the stock market crash before the “great” depression and how 
there were wealthy bankers and businessmen jumping out of windows when they realized 
they screwed up and lost everything. Isn’t it ironic how far we’ve come in 60 years in this 
country that they now know how to fix that little economic problem; they just steal from 
the middle class (who doesn’t have any say in it, elections are a joke) to cover their asses 
and it’s “business-as-usual”. Now when the wealthy fuck up, the poor get to die for the 
mistakes… isn’t that a clever, tidy solution. 
As government agencies go, the FAA is often justifiably referred to as a tombstone 
agency, though they are hardly alone. The recent presidential puppet GW Bush and his 
cronies in their eight years certainly reinforced for all of us that this criticism rings 
equally true for all of the government. Nothing changes unless there is a body count 
(unless it is in the interest of the wealthy sows at the government trough). In a 
government full of hypocrites from top to bottom, life is as cheap as their lies and their 
self-serving laws. 
I know I’m hardly the first one to decide I have had all I can stand. It has always been a 
myth that people have stopped dying for their freedom in this country, and it isn’t limited 
to the blacks, and poor immigrants. I know there have been countless before me and 
there are sure to be as many after. But I also know that by not adding my body to the 
count, I insure nothing will change. I choose to not keep looking over my shoulder at 
“big brother” while he strips my carcass, I choose not to ignore what is going on all 
around me, I choose not to pretend that business as usual won’t continue; I have just had 
enough. 
I can only hope that the numbers quickly get too big to be white washed and ignored that 
the American zombies wake up and revolt; it will take nothing less. I would only hope 
that by striking a nerve that stimulates the inevitable double standard, knee-jerk 
government reaction that results in more stupid draconian restrictions people wake up 
and begin to see the pompous political thugs and their mindless minions for what they 
are. Sadly, though I spent my entire life trying to believe it wasn’t so, but violence not 
only is the answer, it is the only answer. The cruel joke is that the really big chunks of 
shit at the top have known this all along and have be n laughing, at and using this 
awareness against, fools like me all along. 
I saw it written once that the definition of insanity is repeating the same process over and 
over and expecting the outcome to suddenly be different. I am finally ready to stop this 
insanity. Well, Mr. Big Brother IRS man, let’s try something different; take my pound of 
flesh and sleep well. 
The communist creed: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need. 
The capitalist creed: From each according to his gullibility, to each according to his 
greed. 
Joe Stack (1956-2010) 
02/18/2010  
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